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MATERNITY LEAVE: TAKING SEX
DIFFERENCES INTO ACCOUNT
NANCYE. DOWD*
INTRODUCTION
TrofE reconciliation of employment responsibilities with the demands
Xof childbirth and child-rearing remains a critical issue in the achieve-
ment of true equal employment opportunity for women. One of the prin-
cipal factors contributing to the difference in the employment status of
men and women is the resistance of the workplace to accommodating
childbirth and parental responsibilities. This resistance has a dispropor-
tionate impact on women who by their sex bear the burden of pregnancy,
and who by social custom bear the primary responsibility for child-
rearing.
Traditionally employers regarded pregnancy and childbirth as incom-
patible with work and therefore as a justification for barring pregnant
women from the workplace.' The assumption that once women became
mothers they would stay at home to raise their children, rather than
work, underlay the relegation of working women to the status of margi-
nal or temporary employees.2
With the passage of Title VIII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA),4 the primary focus of litigation has been to remove the barriers
to equal employment opportunity created by these policies. Although
this effort has been largely successful,5 simply removing these impedi-
ments has not been enough. Pregnancy continues to hamper women's
employment opportunities, and childcare remains a primarily female
responsibility.6
A wholesale restructuring and reexamination of the workplace is
needed. The existing employment structure must ensure actual, not
merely formal equality of employment opportunity. This requires not
only eliminating facially neutral practices that disadvantage pregnant
women, but also implementing affirmative policies that redress the dis-
* Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School; B.A. 1971, University of
Connecticut; M.A. 1973, University of Illinois; J.D. 198 1, Loyola University of Chicago.
I would like to express my appreciation to my research assistants, Amy Holmes-Hein and
Susan Shipley. I would also like to thank my colleagues and friends who critiqued vari-
ous drafts of the Article, particularly Marc Greenbaum, Gerard Clark, Valerie Epps,
Stephen Hicks and Laurence Stanton. The views expressed herein are my own.
1. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
3. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. vii, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat.
241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
4. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982)).
5. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 23-72 and accompanying text.
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proportionate impact of the existing structure on pregnant women. Even
more fundamentally, the underlying assumptions of the structure of the
workplace must be examined, particularly assumptions concerning the
relationship between work and family responsibilities. The existing
structure assumes that those responsibilities will be split between one
working spouse and one non-working spouse.7 This has a disproportion-
ate impact on working women because they remain primarily responsible
for childcare and housework.'
This Article focuses on restructuring the workplace in the context of
maternity leave. Although most women are no longer, and indeed gener-
ally cannot be, required to take maternity leave,9 many are not guaran-
teed leave or may be provided only with inadequate leave.10 A minority
of states have addressed this problem by enacting statutes requiring that
all employers provide job-protected maternity leave.I1 Two of the stat-
utes, the California and Montana provisions, have been challenged as
discriminatory12 under Title VII 3 and the equal protection clause, 4 and
the Supreme Court has recently agreed to consider the validity of the
California provision.15
This Article considers whether the gender-specific approach incorpo-
rated in state maternity leave provisions is a legally valid means to
restructure the workplace. Part I presents an overview of current mater-
nity leave policies and dispels the common presumption that maternity
7. See Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 Yale
L.J. 913, 919-20, 946-47 (1983); Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of
Patriarchy, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1249, 1251-52, 1279-80 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Law I];
see also Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1499-1501 (1983) (women have traditionally been excluded from the
workplace in exchange for a central role in the home); Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law
and Patriarchy, 3 Harv. Women's L.J. 83, 85-86 (1980) (although American women have
been working outside the home for many years, women are still considered to belong in
the home). Indeed, a recent study reported that less than 10% of American families fit
within the pattern of a married couple with children where the husband is the sole pro-
vider. See Family Policy Panel, Economic Policy Council of UNA-USA, Work and
Family in the United States: A Policy Initiative v (1985) [hereinafter cited as Work and
Family].
For a fascinating look at how assumptions about family and gender roles affect the
welfare system, as opposed to the workplace, see Law I, supra.
8. See Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U.L. Rev. 55, 56-57, 58 n.29 (1979). See infra notes 30-31.
9. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 93-158 and accompanying text.
12. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus.,
692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984), appealfiled, 54 U.S.L.W. 3064-65 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (No.
84-1545). For a discussion of the state statutes in question, see infra notes 102-18 and
accompanying text.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
14. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986) granting cert.
to 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985).
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leave is "virtually universal." Part II analyzes the two primary solutions
to the maternity leave problem suggested by current theories of discrimi-
nation, and argues in favor of an approach that takes into account sex
differences. Part III discusses the structure of the state maternity leave
provisions, and the legal issues raised by those provisions under a sex
differences approach. Part IV examines whether the courts have consid-
ered those issues in the legal challenges brought to date of the state provi-
sions. Although the courts have thus far upheld the state provisions
against challenges brought under both Title VIII6 and the equal protec-
tion clause,17 they have done so largely by avoiding both the question of
whether sex differences can be taken into account by gender-specific leg-
islation, and if so, whether limits can be imposed on such legislation.
Those questions must be confronted, and indeed the Supreme Court will
have the opportunity to do so in resolving the issues raised by the pend-
ing California maternity leave statute case. Part V suggests that
although the Supreme Court has adopted a differences approach under
both constitutional and statutory analysis, it is an approach that is
neither clear in theory nor consistent in application. The questions
raised by the Court's analysis, and a suggested refinement of its ap-
proach, are set forth in the final section.
I. WORKING WOMEN AND MATERNITY LEAVE
The single most dramatic change in the composition of the workforce
in the past twenty years has been the increased proportion of women,
from roughly one-third of the workforce in 1960 to nearly one-half of the
workforce in 1982.1' The current overall labor participation rate of wo-
men is 52.6%. Even more significantly, over two-thirds of women be-
tween twenty and forty-five years old are in the workforce.20 Because so
many women are working during their childbearing years,2 an estimated
85% of all working women will become pregnant at least once during
their worklife.22
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
17. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Consumer Research Center, The Working Woman-A Progress Report 3 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Working Woman]. During the same 20-year period, the number of
males employed increased by 27% while the number of employed females increased by
three times that rate. Id.; see also Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Hand-
book of Labor Statistics 6-7 (1983) (from 1960-1982, the number of male workers in-
creased by approximately 26%) [hereinafter cited as HLS].
19. Working Woman, supra note 18, at 4. The comparable figures for men are an
overall participation rate of 76.6%. See HIS, supra note 18, at 17.
20. See HIS, supra note 18, at 17. The workforce participation rate of males between
the same ages ranges from 85-95%. See id.
21. The prime childbearing years, measured by the greatest number of children born
to women of particular ages, are ages 18-29, followed by ages 30-44. U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1985, 58, 61 (105th ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Statistical Abstract].
22. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess.
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Pregnancy is therefore a predictable, foreseeable condition that will
occur among a substantial portion of working women.23 It is equally
468 (1977) (statement of American Nurses' Association) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
23. The high incidence of pregnancy distinguishes this condition from other disabling
sex-specific conditions or illnesses. See generally E. Hing, M. Kovar & D. Rice, Sex
Differences in Health and Use of Medical Care: United States, 1979, at 35-37 (U.S. Dep't
of Health and Human Servs., National Center for Health Statistics Series 3, No. 24, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Sex Differences]. Medical data suggest that pregnancy occurs at a
far higher rate than any other disabling sex-specific condition during working years (ages
15-64). See id. (table of hospital discharge rates per 10,000 population). First, figures
comparing acute conditions--conditions lasting less than three months requiring medical
attention or resulting in restricted activity, see id. at 46-indicate that the number of
pregnancy-related acute conditions per 100 persons is almost two times the rate for male
genitourinary conditions, a category that includes non-sex-specific conditions. See id. at
20. Thus, if pregnancy were compared only to sex-specific acute conditions occurring
among men of working age, the differential would be even higher.
This likelihood of a far greater disparity between pregnancy and male sex-specific disa-
bling conditions seems to be confirmed by data concerning hospital discharge rates. The
figures reveal a wide disparity between pregnancy and all other sex-specific conditions.
The rates per 10,000 population for sex-specific conditions are as follows:
Diagnosis Ages Ages
15-44 45-64
Females with deliveries 710.8 11.7
Complications from pregnancy 192.4 1.7
Sex-specific conditions
(excluding pregnancy)
female 230.4 161.6
male 19.4 62.7
Id. at 35-37. These figures indicate that the rate of hospital use for pregnancy is over 10
times the rate for all male sex-specific conditions combined. Furthermore, the hospital
discharge rate for delivery is two and one-half times higher than the rate for all other
female sex-specific conditions. Indeed, 45% of all hospital discharges for women between
the ages of 15 and 44 years are pregnancy-related. Id. at 12-13.
Of course, these data only reflect differential disability rates to the extent that hospitali-
zation is required. Data on the frequency of office visits by sex, age and diagnosis, how-
ever, present the same striking differential between pregnancy and all other sex-specific
conditions. The office visit rates per 1000 population are as follows:
Diagnosis Ages Ages
15-44 45-64
Normal pregnancy 443.1 2.8
Complications from pregnancy 38.0
Sex-specific conditions
(excluding pregnancy)
female 235.2 193.6
male 26.5 73.6
Id. at 29-30. These figures show that the rate of office visits is almost five times greater
for pregnancy than for all male sex-specific conditions combined.
Some caveats are in order however. These figures, as well as the discharge rate infor-
mation, do not indicate whether some categories overlap. Furthermore, with respect to
the office visit rates, an individual may visit a physician several times for one condition
and, therefore, the figures may less accurately reflect the incidence of disability than the
hospital discharge rate. Finally, none of this data correlates the occurrence of these con-
ditions with employment; that is, there is available data on acute conditions in the general
[Vol. 54
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predictable that pregnancy will involve some period of disability during
which the pregnant (or recently pregnant) employee will be unable to
work. For the vast majority of women this period of disability will last
for no more than six weeks.24 In order to ensure that pregnancy disabil-
population and available data on labor participation rates, but I can locate no data that
analyze both of these factors in order to determine the rate of disability for particular
conditions among the employed population. I have also been unable to find data that
specifically correlates individual sex-specific conditions, their incidence or prevalence in
the population by age and sex (which would suggest likeliness of occurrence or predict-
ability of occurrence during working years), and disability. General disability figures,
however, indicate that the rate of workdays lost due to acute conditions, as defined above,
in 1981 was 3.4 days for all employed persons; for employed persons aged 17-44, the rate
was 3.2 days for men, 4.1 days for women; for employed persons aged 45 and over, the
rate was 2.6 days for men, 3.5 days for women. Health Insurance Association of
America, Source Book of Health Insurance Data 1982-1983, at 72 (1983).
Nonetheless, the figures support the conclusion that the occurrence of pregnancy
among the working age population is far more likely than any other sex-specific condi-
tion. Since pregnancy always involves some period of disability, see infra note 24, the
absence of adequate maternity leave for pregnancy disability would adversely affect the
employment status of a substantial proportion of women. See infra notes 27-35 and ac-
companying text.
The figures also indicate that apart from pregnancy, the occurrence of sex-specific ill-
nesses or conditions is much greater for women than for men. The hospital discharge and
office visit rates for such conditions are approximately three and one-half times greater
for women than for men. See National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., Office Visits for Male Genitourinary Conditions: National Ambulatory
Medical Case Survey: United States, 1977-78, Advancedata, Nov. 3, 1980, at 1 (female
hospital visit rate for genitourinary problems over three times as great as rate for males).
Again, one cannot directly extrapolate from this data the existence of job disability; that
is, inability to work because of the condition. If there were further data confirming a
differential in the occurrence of disabling sex-specific conditions coupled with informa-
tion on the duration of disability, then this data could be analyzed with respect to
whether the structure of existing illness and disability policies has a disproportionate ef-
fect on women who may suffer more sex-related disabilities. See infra text accompanying
notes 316-19.
24. The period of actual disability from pregnancy appears to be a matter of conjec-
ture rather than based on any scientific or medical research, as indicated by testimony
offered at the hearings on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). The most common
estimates for disability following normal childbirth presented at the congressional hear-
ings by doctors, actuaries and insurers ranged from four to eight weeks. See Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 22, at 7 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (6-8 weeks); id. at 445 (remarks of Mrs.
Rubin, actuary, U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, Washington D.C., speaking of Labor De-
partment figures) (average of 7.5 weeks); id. at 468 (statement of American Nurses
Ass'n) (6-8 weeks); Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy:
Hearings on H. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportuni-
ties of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, 206-07
(1977) (statement of Ruth Weyand, Associate General Counsel, International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC) (6 weeks average) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings Part I]; Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of
Pregnancy: Hearings on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part II,
66-67 (1977) (statement of Dr. Dorothy Czarnecki, representing American Citizens Con-
cerned for Life, Philadelphia, Pa.) (6 weeks or less) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings
Part II]. The insurance industry used 11.3 weeks as the average disability period, see
Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 445 (remarks of Mrs. Rubin, actuary, U.S. Civil Ser-
vice Comm'n, Washington, D.C.), which was the major factor in the high estimate given
1986]
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ity is not an excuse for actual or constructive discharge, or for any dimi-
nution in the terms and conditions of employment,25 maternity leave
during the period of pregnancy-related disability is essential. Such leave
by the industry for the cost of adding pregnancy coverage to disability insurance. On the
other hand, information presented at the hearings by the state of Hawaii, which provides
pregnancy disability benefits under its disability statute, showed that the average annual
total disability period for women employees, including pregnancy, was 4.4 weeks in 1975,
compared to a male average of 5.1 weeks. See House Hearings Part I, supra, at 203
(statement of Ruth Weyand).
Data collected by the National Center for Health Statistics from the 1979 National
Health Interview Survey indicates that the number of days of restricted activity per 100
persons per year for deliveries and disorders of pregnancy and the puerperium are 46.7
days, which supports a six-week period of disability. See Sex Differences, supra note 23,
at 20. On the other hand, in various cases involving maternity leave litigated in the
1970's, the disability period after childbirth ranged from five days to four weeks. See
House Hearings Part II, supra, at 106-07.
I have been unable to locate scientific or medical data that support the proposition that
pregnancy disability will normally last four to eight weeks, and no such data was
presented at the PDA hearings. It is generally recognized that it takes approximately six
weeks after childbirth for the female reproductive tract to return to its normal non-
pregnant state, a period referred to as the puerperium. J. Pritchard, P. MacDonald & N.
Gant, Williams Obstetrics 367 (17th ed. 1985). It is also recognized, however, that this
condition is not normally disabling. Id. at 376-77. A report of the American Medical
Association's Council on Scientific Affairs candidly admits that there is virtually no sci-
entific data on the frequency, occurrence or duration of disability during pregnancy or
postpartum. Effects of Pregnancy on Work Performance, 251 J. A.M.A. 1995, 1995-96
(April 20, 1984). "The advice given by generations of physicians . . . has historically
been more the result of social and cultural beliefs about the nature of pregnancy (and of
pregnant women) than the result of any documented medical experience with pregnancy
and work." Id. at 1995. "The 'magic' six weeks currently designated as the postpartum
period may be no more reasonable when rationally evaluated than would ten weeks or
two." Id. at 1996.
This lack of consensus or support for the common assumption that disability from
childbirth will normally extend from four to eight weeks suggests several things. First,
the period of actual disability, based on a case-by-case determination of individual ability
to return to work and the demands of the particular job, may be considerably shorter
than is assumed. This may alleviate employer concerns regarding leaving a position open
or the cost of hiring a temporary replacement (or even the need for doing so). Second,
because the figures do not appear to encompass either pre-childbirth disability or post-
childbirth complications or their rate of occurrence, they represent only a generalized
estimate of the probability of complications that might extend the period of disability
before or after childbirth. This second possibility, however, is undercut by data showing
that the occurrence of pre-childbirth disability or post-childbirth complications is rela-
tively infrequent, suggesting that employers are unlikely to be confronted by the necessity
of providing extended disability leave. See Sex Differences, supra note 23, at 29, 36 (ta-
bles show that only two percent of women remain in the hosptial due to childbirth com-
plications; only 3.8% require office visits for complications of childbirth). Where an
extended leave would substantially interfere with business operations, employee rights to
reinstatement may have to be balanced against legitimate employer concerns. See infra
note 164 and accompanying text. Finally, even if the period of disability is more limited
than commonly assumed, this does not remove the issue of whether gender-neutral
parenting leave should be provided. See infra note 40.
25. Employers are not required by federal law to provide disability or personal leave.
See S. Kamerman, A. Kahn & P. Kingston, Maternity Policies and Working Women 4
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Maternity Policies]. Only six states require employers to
maintain disability policies. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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must include adequate leave time for pregnancy-related disability, guar-
anteed reinstatement and maintenance of pre-leave job status and
benefits.26
The presence or absence of reasonable maternity leave has an enor-
mous impact on working women. This is evident in the pattern of wo-
men's workforce participation rates. Despite the overall dramatic
increase in the number of women in the workforce, there continues to be
a significant difference between the workforce participation rates of mar-
ried women and women with children, and single women. Over 60% of
single women and 75% of divorced women work, as compared to ap-
proximately 50% of married women and married women with chil-
dren.27 In addition, women are far more likely to work part-time:
approximately one quarter of working women work part-time,28 and wo-
men constitute more than half of the part-time workforce.2 9 While there
are no doubt many reasons for these differences, they certainly reflect the
lack of support in the workplace for pregnant women and working
mothers,3" as well as the disproportionate responsibility of women for
26. These are only the minimum requirements of an adequate maternity leave policy.
Such a policy should also include paid leave, that is, full wage replacement. If this were
required by state legislation, however, preemption issues under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 11983) (ERISA), might be
raised. See infra note 217. For the possibility of a federally-mandated paid disability
policy, see infra note 77. My focus in this Article is solely on unpaid leave.
27. See Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 298, Time of Change: 1983
Handbook on Women Workers 12-15 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Handbook on Women
Workers]; Working Woman, supra note 18, at 5.
On the other hand, women are no longer remaining out of the workforce for long
periods of time: the worklife expectancy rates for women are now close to those of men.
According to 1970 figures, the worklife expectancy of men at age 20 was 41.5 years; for
single women it was 41.2 years; for married women with no children it was 34.1 years.
Women in the U.S. Labor Force 30 (A. Cahn ed. 1979). This is also reflected in the
change in the labor participation rates of women based on the age of their youngest child.
In 1970, there were four clear "steps" in the participation rate: for mothers of children
up to two years old, the rate was 30% or less; for mothers of children three to five years
old, the rate was 35-39%; for mothers of children six to eleven years old, the rate was 40-
50%; for mothers of children over junior high school age, the rate was over 50%. By
1983, there were only three steps and higher participation rates at each step: for mothers
of infants, the rate was 45%; for mothers with children two-five years old, the rate was
50-57%; for mothers with children of school age, the rate was 60-67%. Waldman, Labor
Force Statistics from a Family Perspective, Monthly Lab. Rev., Dec. 1983, at 16, 17.
28. See Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 27, at 92. The proportion of
working women working part-time has decreased, although it should be remembered
that, at the same time, the number and proportion of women working has increased dra-
matically. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In 1979, approximately one-third
of all working women worked part-time, see Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 48,
while before 1978, over half worked part-time, see M. Meyer, Women and Employee
Benefits 14 (1978).
29. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 48.
30. Part of that necessary support framework is the availability of pregnancy-related
benefits, particularly maternity leave. Equally important is the availability of child care
services. For an overview of current child care arrangements, see M. O'Connell & C.
Rogers, Child Care Arrangements of Working Mothers: June 1982 (Current Population
Reports, Series P-23, No. 129, 1983); Kamerman, Child-Care Services: A National Pic-
19861
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child-rearing and housework. 3'
The presence or absence of maternity leave policies also affects the
range of employment opportunities for those women who do work. The
availability of maternity leave with guaranteed reinstatement and mainte-
nance of job status directly affects the income, actual and potential, of
working women. The persistent difference in income levels between men
and women32 may be attributed in part to the disruption of employment
due to inadequate maternity leave policies.3 3 Furthermore, to the extent
the income difference reflects the occupational segregation of women in
low paying, dead end jobs, 34 that segregation may reflect a "choice" dic-
tated in part by the lasting effects of career disruption due to inadequate
maternity policies.35
Historically, the two most common employer policies concerning preg-
nancy were to provide no leave at all, thereby forcing the employee to
resign or be discharged, or to impose mandatory unpaid leave during
pregnancy and for a period of time after childbirth. 36 As a result, a virtu-
ture, Monthly Lab. Rev., Dec. 1983, at 35-39. In addition, the structure of working
hours and compensation has an adverse effect on parenting in general and particularly on
working women to the extent they remain primarily responsible for child care. See Frug,
supra note 8, at 55-59.
31. Frug, supra note 8, at 56-57. For example, unemployed women who desire to
work but who are unable to seek employment cite home responsibilities as the primary
reason. HLS, supra note 18, at 34. In descending order, the other specific reasons cited
as of 1982 were "think cannot get job," school attendance and ill health/disability. Id.
Among women in the labor force who indicated they did not want to work, the over-
whelming majority indicated they were currently "keeping house." Id. This is not sur-
prising in view of the fact that studies show that wives perform most of the housework in
the average household. See Boston Globe, Nov. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 3 ("women work
twice as many hours on homemaking and child care tasks as men"); see also Freedman,
supra note 7, at 914 n.4 (1983) (wives perform approximately 70% of the housework in
the average household).
32. Women on average earn only 50-65% as much as men, and within the same occu-
pational categories women earn substantially less than men. Working Woman, supra
note 18, at 6-7; Shack-Marquez, Earnings Difference Between Men and Women: Al In-
troductory Note, Monthly Lab. Rev., June 1984, at 15.
33. See House Hearings Part I, supra note 24, at 64 ("Further, if seniority is lost, a
woman's entire career could be affected: there may be no job to return to when she has
recovered or. . . she will have a slower advancement to higher positions because other
employees hired later will have priority.") (testimony of Laurence Gold, Special Counsel,
AFL-CIO).
34. Women are concentrated in clerical, service and professional-technical jobs, see
Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 27, at 51-62, 87-96, and within those areas
they tend to hold the lowest paying jobs, see Mellor, Investigating the Differences in
Weekly Earnings of Women and Men, Monthly Lab. Rev., June 1984, at 17-19; see also
M. Gold, A Dialogue on Comparable Worth 6-7 (1983) (women workers are in "low
paying, dead-end jobs").
35. See supra note 33.
36. Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 35-38; Silverman, Maternity Policies in In-
dustry, 8 The Child, Aug. 1943, at 20, 21; see Worthy, Maternity Leaves of Absence,
Management Record, July-Aug. 1959, at 232, 233 (in 1959, half of plans surveyed had
mandatory maternity leaves; one-fourth stipulated a definite time for returning to work
after pregnancy). According to one study conducted by the Conference Board in 1964,
approximately 73% of employers required employees to leave work at a specific point
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ally inevitable consequence of pregnancy was the loss of employment or,
at a minimum, the forced loss of income for a period of time. To the
extent leave was granted, it was usually given without any guarantee of
reinstatement, and at the cost of loss of seniority and fringe benefits.37
These policies reflected either of two assumptions: that women were
marginal, temporary workers who would leave the workforce once they
assumed their primary role of childbearing and child-raising (justifying
discharge or forced resignation), or that women must be protected during
pregnancy and after childbirth by excluding them from the hazards of
the workplace (justifying mandatory leave).38  Furthermore, these poli-
cies also assumed that women's income was non-essential to maintaining
themselves or their families (justifying unpaid leave, discontinuation of
fringe benefits and no guarantee of reinstatement).39
To the extent that maternity leave was provided, it was largely pre-
during pregnancy, and 59% permitted pregnant employees to work no longer than 26
weeks after conception. See National Industrial Conference Board, Studies in Personnel
Policy, No. 194, Personnel Practices in Factory and Office: Manufacturing 122 (1964).
In a 1965 survey conducted by Prentice-Hall of 1000 employers, only 40% of office em-
ployers provided leave; 75% of plant employers had leave policies, but of those, more
than 80% were mandatory leave policies. House Hearings Part II, supra note 24, at 149.
This high rate of mandatory leave policies changed significantly, however, after the pas-
sage of Title VII. By 1974, only 20% of leave policies were still mandatory. See id. at
149-50.
Some of these policies regarding mandatory leave were required by state law. Until the
1970's, six states and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico prohibited the employment of
women for periods before and after childbirth. Koontz, Childbirth and Child Rearing
Leave: Job-Related Benefits, 17 N.Y.L.F. 480, 482-83 (1971).
37. The pattern of benefits for women has consistently reflected the view that women
are not "worth" such benefits because they will leave the workforce. See Maternity Poli-
cies, supra note 25, at 33; M. Meyer, supra note 28, at 2-4. Thus, for example, it was
common before passage of the PDA for employers to exclude pregnancy from health
insurance and disability policies. Koontz, supra note 36, at 490-93. The problem of loss
of pension benefits due to a break in employment has been remedied by passage of the
Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.A. (West 1985)), which amends the vesting provisions of the ERISA,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053(b)(3)(E) (West
1985).
38. The treatment of pregnancy in the workplace has reflected the broader patriarchal
structure of society. See, e.g., Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism, 14-
17 (1981); K. Millett, Sexual Politics 39-43 (1969); Clark, Politics and Low: The Theory
and Practice of the Ideology of Male Supremacy, or, It Wasn't God Who Made Honky
Tonk Angels, in Law and Policy 35, 37-41 (D. Weisstub ed. 1976); Rifkin, supra note 7, at
83-88; Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in
The Politics of Law 117, 117-24 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
39. See M. Gold, supra note 34, at 22. To the contrary, both historically and cur-
rently, women have worked to provide essential support for themselves and their families.
J. Baer, The Chains of Protection: The Judicial Response to Women's Labor Legislation
21-22 (1978). According to 1980 census figures, working wives' salaries constituted 27%
of family income. Women who worked full time year round contributed an even larger
percentage to family income (38%), as did women in lower income families (69%).
Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 27, at 17. Furthermore, almost 16% of all
families were maintained by a single female, over five times the number of families main-
tained by single males. Id. at 15.
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mised on notions of the appropriate social role of women.4" While ma-
ternity leave served the necessary purpose of providing time off from
work because of disability associated with pregnancy and childbirth, it
was based on the idea that it was socially inappropriate and physically
harmful for a woman to work once she became visibly pregnant, and that
after childbirth she would assume primary responsibility for child-rear-
ing. Thus, the leave provided was a combined disability and parenting
40. I do not mean to suggest that such attitudes have become historical curiosities;
they are still very much with us. See, e.g., Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights
Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.) (teacher's contract not renewed after she became
pregnant because of employer's desire that mothers should be at home with pre-school
age children), appealfiled, 106 S. Ct. 379 (1985).
The idea that women are "natural" care givers and the most appropriate care givers,
and therefore should have primary responsibility for child-rearing, is a central concept of
patriarchy. See Chodorow, Mothering, Male Dominance, and Capitalism, in Capitalist
Patriarchy and The Case for Socialist Feminism 83, 84-86 (Z. Eisenstein ed. 1979). This
notion seemed to gain a scientific patina with the development of "bonding" theory, the
idea that there was a critical period of mother-infant interaction after childbirth and in
the first few months of infancy. M. Klaus & J. Kennell, Parent-Infant Bonding 39
(1982); Klaus & Kennell, Parent to Infant Bonding: Setting the Record Straight, 102 J.
Pediatrics 575, 575-76 (1983). The research on which this conclusion was based has been
criticized as pseudo-scientific and sexist. See Arney, Maternal-Infant Bonding: The Poli-
tics of Falling in Love With Your Child, 6 Feminist Stud. 547, 563-65 (1980); see also
Lamb, The Bonding Phenomenon: Misinterpretations and Their Implications, 101 J. Pedi-
atrics 555, 555-56 (1982) (more than 20 studies show that early mother-infant contact has
no enduring effects on either mothers or infants); Wasserman, The Nature and Function
of Early Mother-Infant Interaction, in Psychological Aspects of Pregnancy, Birthing and
Bonding 324, 329-30 (B. Blum ed. 1980) (expressing skepticism about necessity of early
critical period in establishing vital mother-infant relationship). This critique suggests
that parenting is important in early child development, see Arney, supra, at 564-65 (quot-
ing A. Clarke-Stewart, Child Care in the Family: A Review of Research and Some Pro-
positions for Policy 21 (1977)), but that role should not be limited to mothers or to a
critical, brief period immediately following childbirth.
Moreover, limiting early child-rearing duties to mothers may have negative conse-
quences for psychological development. Several researchers have documented the conse-
quences of the female primary child-rearer model on gender identification and general
psychological development.
This crucial mothering role contributes not only to child development but also
to the reproduction of male supremacy. Because women are responsible for
early child care and for most later socialization as well, because fathers are
more absent from the home, and because men's activities generally have been
removed from the home while women's have remained within it, boys have diffi-
culty attaining a stable, masculine gender role identification.
Chodorow, supra, at 94. See also D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sex-
ual Arrangements and Human Malaise 54, 93-94 (1976) (female-dominated child care
fosters male sexual possessiveness and a low esteem for women); C. Gilligan, In a Differ-
ent Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 7-9 (1982) (because the pri-
mary caretaker of young children is typically female, relationships and issues of
dependency and individuation are experienced differently by men and women). The im-
portance of parenting by both mothers and fathers in early child development argues for
the establishment of non-gender based parental leave policies, a question not addressed by
this Article. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 14-24, 144-45; see also Taub, From
Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 381, 381 (1984-
85) (child-rearing leaves should be called "parental leaves" and should be "extended to
men as well as women") [hereinafter cited as Taub I].
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leave that incorporated stereotypes about both the extent and nature of
pregnancy disability, and child-rearing as a primarily female
responsibility.
With the advent of Title VI1V and the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act,42 many of the most restrictive maternity leave policies have been
removed.43 Courts have almost universally struck down mandatory
leave policies.' Furthermore, courts have consistently held that if em-
ployers maintain employment policies for temporary disabilities, preg-
nancy must be included among the covered disabilities.4"
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
42. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1982)).
43. An area of developing restrictions, however, is evolving out of concerns for fetal
health and development. See generally Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work
Environments." The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 63 (1980); Williams, Firing the Women to Protect the
Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under
Title VII, 69 Geo. L.J. 641 (1981). For discussion of how this might be affected by a sex
differences approach, see infra note 319.
44. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647-48 (1974); Craw-
ford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1123-26 (2d Cir. 1976); Green v. Waterford Bd. of
Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 526 F. Supp.
1035, 1041-42 (W.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1983);
Somers v. Aldine Indep. School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900, 903-04 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd
mem., 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980); Fabian v. Independent School Dist. No. 89, 409 F.
Supp. 94, 100 (W.D. Okla. 1976). But see Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361,
371-72 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam) (mandatory maternity leave policy after
first 13 weeks of pregnancy for stewardesses justified by concerns for passenger safety),
cert denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Condit v. United Air Lines, 558 F.2d 1176, 1176-77
(4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (mandatory maternity leave policies for stewardesses justi-
fied by bona fide occupational qualification defense), cert denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978);
Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1187, 1188, 1191 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (unpaid mandatory maternity leave justified by business necessity), afftd, 730 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462
U.S. 669, 683-85 (1983) (plan giving pregnant employee wives lower benefits than preg-
nant female employees held unlawful; Court concluded it afforded married male employ-
ees less protection than married female employees); Harper v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 619
F.2d 489, 491-92 (5th Cir. 1980) (reinstatement policy requiring women on pregnancy
leave to show proof of one normal menstrual period before return to work held invalid);
Maddox v. Grandview Care Center, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1404, 1406-07 (M.D. Ga. 1985)
(limitation of maternity leave to three months, while no limitation imposed on "illness"
leave, is facially discriminatory; employee who suffered complications from pregnancy
was unlawfully denied six months leave and discharged); Greenspan v. Automobile Club,
495 F. Supp. 1021, 1053-54 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (forced termination because of childbirth
violates Title VII).
45. Most courts required the inclusion of pregnancy in private employers' disability
plans prior to the PDA, see, e.g., Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208,
1213 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 434 U.S. 158 (1977) (per curiam); Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Hutch-
inson v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1976); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651,
653-54 (8th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 205-06 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Farkas v. School Dist., 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 288, 289-90 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir.
1974), until the Supreme Court decided in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
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It has been widely heralded that as a result of this legislation and liti-
gation concerning pregnancy discrimination, employers have almost uni-
versally adopted maternity leave policies.46 This assertion masks the
reality, however, that a substantial number of working women are enti-
tled to no leave or only to inadequate leave.
The best estimates of the availability of maternity leave indicate that
fully one-quarter of all employers do not provide any maternity leave. 4
7
Even this figure may overstate the availability of maternity leave, because
it fails to indicate the extent to which leave is provided where women
work. Maternity leave policies are least common in the retail trade and
(1976), that such coverage was not required. For discussion of Gilbert, see infra notes
203-04. Congress superseded Gilbert with the passage of the PDA. See text accompany-
ing infra notes 203-06.
46. See M. Meyer, supra note 28, at 2, 4 (pre-PDA study noting that maternity poli-
cies have been instituted due to Title VII and EEOC guidelines).
47. Recent studies have placed the number of employers providing some form of ma-
ternity leave between 75% and 97%, see Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 52-59, but
the higher figures must be discounted because the studies have been heavily weighted
toward large employers, who are more likely to have such policies. See id. at 55-56. The
range in figures presented in Maternity Policies is based on three studies cited by the
authors. The 1977 Quality of Employment Survey reported that, of women working at
least 20 hours a week, 75% of the respondents were entitled to some job-protected leave,
a 15% increase since 1969. See R. Quinn & G. Staines, The 1977 Quality of Employment
Survey: Descriptive Statistics, with Comparison Data from the 1969-70 and 1972-73
Surveys, at 58, 294 (1979). Job-protected leave was more likely to be provided at large
(500 or more employees) firms (89%), versus small (1-9 employees) firms (39%). Mater-
nity Policies, supra note 25, at 53 (using data from R. Quinn & G. Staines, supra).
The second survey cited was a 1978 Conference Board Survey showing that 97% of the
sampled companies provided job-protected leave. Id. (citing M. Meyer, supra note 28, at
2). This study, however, is heavily weighted toward larger corporations. Id.
Finally, the authors conducted a small-scale study of their own in 1981 of a cross
section of 250 companies which, they admitted, tends to underemphasize small firms, and
therefore likely overstates the level of benefits provided. See id. at 55-56. This study
indicated that while 88% of the employers surveyed provided leave, only 72% formally
guaranteed the same or a comparable job and seniority protection. Id. at 56. This shows,
according to the authors, that "the policy of a protected leave is not 'virtually universal'
throughout all sectors of the economy, even if it is within large corporate business." Id.
(emphasis in original).
This general picture is confirmed by several more recent studies. A 1983 survey con-
ducted by the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) found that 86% of the surveyed compa-
nies provided job rights to employees returning from maternity leave. See Bureau of
National Affairs, Personnel Policies Forum Survey No. 136, Policies on Leave From
Work 24-25 (1983) [hereinafter cited as BNA Survey]. A 1984 survey of 384 Fortune 500
companies found that 95% provided short-term disability pay, see Catalyst, Preliminary
Report on a Nationwide Survey of Maternity/Parental Leaves 3 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Catalyst] and 52% provided unpaid leave to female employees, id. at 4. A survey
conducted in 1984 by Bernard Hodes Advertising of 153 companies found that 51 com-
panies provided unpaid leave, 50 provided partial salary, 33 provided full salary leave,
and 52 had some combination of salary and unpaid leave. Bernard Hodes Advertising,
Survey of U.S. Companies' Maternity, Paternity and Childcare Policies app. table I, table
11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hodes Survey]. For a look at how law schools treat the
issues of maternity and parental leave see Chused, Faculty Parenthood: Law School
Treatment of Pregnancy and Child Care (Society of American Law Teachers 1985).
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service industries,48 where the largest proportion of all women workers
are employed.49 Furthermore, leave policies are far more common in
large companies than in small compaies,50 although nearly forty percent
of all workers are employed by businesses with less than fifty employ-
ees.5" Thus, the proportion of women workers affected by no leave poli-
cies may be substantially higher than the available data would indicate.52
Even where maternity leave is provided, the structure and operation of
leave policies may result in no leave or inadequate leave for a substantial
proportion of women workers. First, many policies impose eligibility re-
quirements based on length of service that translate into no leave for
employees during their first year of employment. Two recent surveys
indicate that over forty percent of all employers, and perhaps as many as
twice that amount, impose length-of-service requirements on maternity
leave ranging from three to twenty-two months.53 Furthermore, leave is
commonly not extended to part-time employees, which has enormous
48. Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 57. The unavailability of maternity leaves in
these sectors does not appear to be affected by the presence or absence of unionization.
Indeed, in general, unionized companies appear to have a lower incidence of maternity
leave policies. According to recent figures, only 36% of all collective bargaining agree-
ments contain maternity leave provisions, with such provisions more common in con-
tracts in manufacturing industries (40%) than in non-manufacturing industries (30%). 2
Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts (BNA) No. 990, at 62:1 (May 12,
1983).
49. Handbook on Women Workers, supra note 27, at 69. In 1981, two of every five
women were employed in ten occupations; of those ten, all were in the retail trade and
service sectors-e.g., sales clerk, waitress, private household worker and nursing aide.
Id. at 54. In 1981, the service industry was the largest industry division in the employ-
ment of women workers; within it 59% of all employees were women. Id. at 69. The
wholesale and retail trade industry is the second largest employer of women, and most of
the women in this industry (7.6 million of 9 million in 1981) are in retail trade. Id. In
fact, women constitute over two-fifths of all retail trade employees. Id.
50. Hodes Survey, supra note 47, at 7; Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 52, 57-59.
51. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Reporting Units and March Employment and Percent
of Reporting Units and Employment in Establishments with 0-19, 20.49, and 50 and
Over Employees, First Quarter 1984, at 1 (unpublished) (available in the files of the Ford-
ham Law Review). In the retail sector the proportion of employees in businesses with less
than 50 employees is over 50% while in the services sector the proportion is slightly over
40%. Id. at 3. No figures are available that further subdivide this distribution of employ-
ees on the basis of sex.
52. Because most available studies of maternity leave measure the existence of em-
ployer policies versus the extent of employee coverage, it is difficult to estimate the exact
proportion of women affected by no-leave policies. Furthermore, any estimate would
have to take into account the number of women in the workforce in their childbearing
years in order to determine the impact of no-leave policies on those women who could
become pregnant.
53. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 60. One study showed that 84% of
employers impose length of service requirements; of these, 44% require 9 to 22 months of
service, 20% require four to six months of service, and 28% require three months of
service. See id. (authors' study). According to the BNA survey, the most common ser-
vice requirements were as follows: for plant employees, three months (17% of firms )
followed by six months (14%); for office employees, six months (18%) followed by three
months (17%); and for management employees, six months (15%) followed by three
months (14%). See BNA Survey, supra note 47, at 21.
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impact given the number of women who work part-time.5 4
Second, even if an employee is eligible for leave, the duration of leave
may be inadequate. Approximately seventy percent of employers provid-
ing leave impose a maximum limit on leave, which may not be sufficient
if an employee is disabled during pregnancy and/or after childbirth be-
yond that limit." Moreover, many employers provide maternity leave
only to the extent of the benefits to which an employee is entitled under
the employer's sick pay56 or disability insurance57 policies.5" If "mater-
nity leave" is defined by the benefit period, this may result in significant
limitations on the duration of leave. Under most sick leave policies the
amount of sick leave to which an employee is entitled is directly tied to
length of service.59 Employees with less than five years of service com-
monly are entitled to only two weeks of sick leave and, in any case, the
maximum period of leave is generally four weeks.60 Women are likely to
be entitled to very limited leave under such policies as they are likely to
become pregnant when they have not accumulated significant seniority. 61
Furthermore, even if a woman worker is entitled to the maximum period
of sick leave, it may be insufficient to cover the full period of pregnancy-
related disability. 62
54. See text accompanying supra notes 28-29.
55. See BNA Survey, supra note 47, at 24; see also Maternity Policies, supra note 25,
at 57 (almost 60% of those granting leave limit it to two to three months). The Confer-
ence Board survey indicates, however, that a substantial proportion of employers (79%)
would extend leave for continued disability, but it is not clear for how long. M. Meyer,
supra note 28, at 7.
56. An estimated two-thirds of all employers have sick leave policies, which are
designed to provide short-term leave for illness. Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 67;
Statistical Abstract, supra note 21, at 421. These policies are more likely to be made
available for professional and technical employees (over 90%) than to production em-
ployees (42%). Id. Paid sick leave usually provides full wage replacement. See BNA
Survey, supra note 47, at 13 (in 89% of companies, employees are paid for sick leave days
at their regular rate).
57. The estimates of the percentage of employers who provide short-term disability
insurance to their employees vary considerably. One study of employers put the figure at
50%, see Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 69 (authors' study), while another study
placed the figure at 95%. See Catalyst, supra note 47, at 3. In contrast to sick pay,
disability insurance benefits often are limited to a specific figure or a percentage of salary,
and therefore only constitute partial wage replacement. See M. Meyer, supra note 28, at
7-8; see also Catalyst, supra note 47, at 3 (disability benefits often consist of partial pay).
One study found that only 28% of the employers surveyed provided both sick leave and
disability insurance, while 20% provided neither benefit. Maternity Policies, supra note
25, at 72. Where employers provided disability benefits, few employers offered unpaid
leave beyond the medical disability period. Id.
58. See Catalyst, supra note 47, at 3; Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 66.
59. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 67.
60. Id. at 67-68; see also M. Meyer, supra note 28, at 8 ("median allowable period of
benefit payments for a one-year employee is two weeks").
61. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 67-68.
62. See id. The estimated period of disability from childbirth is four to eight weeks.
See supra note 24 for the proposition that this figure might be shorter on an individual
basis. However, assuming the use of the standard estimated period of disability, even if
an employee were entitled to the maximum period of sick leave under most policies, this
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Similarly, if maternity leave is provided according to the terms of a
short-term disability insurance plan, the duration of leave may be se-
verely restricted. Women with normal pregnancies are generally limited
to six weeks of disability benefit payments.63 This may be sufficient to
cover pregnancy-related disability for such normal pregnancies, but it is
likely to be inadequate if complications occur during pregnancy or after
childbirth that extend the period of disability."
Although many maternity leave policies fail to provide an adequate
period of leave for pregnancy-related disability, other policies entitle fe-
male employees to leave extending far beyond the period of actual disa-
bility, thus providing parenting leave in addition to disability leave. For
example, some employers permit female employees to take maternity
leave for six months or one year.6 5 Very few employers, however, pro-
might not be sufficient to cover the period of disability from normal childbirth. Leave
will also be limited to the extent the employee has been absent for non-pregnancy related
illness.
63. Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 69; M. Meyer, supra note 28, at 7. Accord-
ing to one study, half of the plans would provide disability benefits for up to 26 weeks if
complications develop. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 69.
64. See supra note 62. It is possible that an employer would permit continued leave
on an unpaid basis. One study indicates, however, that such policies are uncommon. See
Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 73. That study showed that, at most, 25% of em-
ployers permit leave beyond the disability insurance period. Id. (authors' study). The
Catalyst survey indicated that 51% of the companies surveyed offered unpaid leave, but it
is unclear whether this is offered alone or in addition to paid or partially paid disability
leave. See Catalyst, supra note 47, at 4.
Alternatively, leave could be extended by the use of vacation time, a practice permitted
by 43% of the employers in the BNA survey. See BNA Survey, supra note 47, at 23.
This can hardly count as maternity leave, however. In addition, vacation time may sim-
ply be unavailable to a low seniority employee or to one who has already used the time
for vacation.
It should also be noted that while leave may be provided under a paid leave policy,
only 38.9% of employers provide full-salary paid leave. See Catalyst, supra note 47, at 3.
The Catalyst survey found that paid leave, if offered at all, was usually only provided
through the use of paid vacation time. Only 25 of the 384 companies surveyed responded
that they offered paid leave beyond disability or vacation pay. See id. at 2,4. The Hodes
survey found that only seven of the 153 of the responding companies paid full salary as
long as medically required. Hodes Survey, supra note 47, at app. table 1.
65. The Catalyst survey reported that 35.9% of the surveyed employers provided un-
paid maternity leave (not based on disability) of two or three months; 28.2% provided
leave of four to six months; 7.2% provided leave for seven months to one year. See
Catalyst, supra note 47, at 4; see also Hodes Survey, supra note 47, at app. table I (of 153
employers providing unpaid leave, 26 allow up to 16 weeks; 18 provide 17-26 weeks; four
provide 27-52 weeks). The Catalyst survey also indicated that approximately half of
these employers provided female employees with unpaid leave, while roughly one-third
provided unpaid leave to male employees. See Catalyst, supra note 47, at 4. Moreover,
where leave was provided to both male and female employees, the maximum unpaid leave
granted to men was not significantly shorter than that granted to women. Id.
For a discussion of the maternity leave provisions of various state employers, see infra
note 93. An earlier study conducted in the late 1970's indicated that the typical mater-
nity leave period was up to six months. See M. Meyer, supra note 28, at 5-6. The data in
the more recent Catalyst survey supports the inference that the trends are toward limiting
maternity leave to the period of pregnancy-related disability, see Catalyst, supra note 47,
at 4, while recognizing that more extended leave is a parenting leave (apart from those
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vide comparable paternity leave or gender-neutral parenting leave.66
These policies are premised on the assumption that women are uniquely
capable of, and should be primarily responsible for, childcare.67 At the
same time, these policies implicitly deny the parenting ability of men.
They serve, therefore, to perpetuate invalid stereotypes of appropriate
social roles that particularly disadvantage women.
Finally, in additon to the problems of eligibility and leave duration,
many maternity leave policies do not ensure reinstatement after leave or
the protection of pre-leave employment status. As many as one-quarter
of all women provided with maternity leave are not entitled to reinstate-
ment.6' Again, this is more prevalent in smaller companies and in the
retail trade and service sectors of the economy.69 In addition, even if
reinstatement rights are provided, they may be guaranteed only for a lim-
ited period of time, thus in effect limiting the length of permissible
leave. 7' There are no available statistics on the breakdown of companies
guaranteeing reinstatement to the same job versus a comparable job on
return from leave, nor on how companies define comparability. 7I There
are also no statistics concerning the maintenance of seniority and job
status at pre-leave levels. 72
In summary, contrary to the belief that maternity leave is virtually
instances of continuing disability) that must be provided to both female and male employ-
ees. See id.; cf. Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 144-45 (European countries have
recognized that post-childbirth leave is not just for physical disability: rather, it encom-
passes "the much broader role of providing support for ... parent-child relationships").
66. Paternity leave is provided by only a small minority of employers. According to
the Catalyst survey, 36% of the reporting firms provide unpaid paternity leave to men,
see Catalyst, supra note 47, at 4-5, although it is notable that men rarely take advantage
of such policies, see id. at 5. The BNA survey found that only two-fifths of the surveyed
employers had leave provisions allowing men time off for the birth of their child, see
BNA Survey, supra note 47, at 26. The maximum time permitted ranged from two days
to one year, with a median of 90 days for plant workers and office staff. Id. The Hodes
study found only 14% of the companies had any paternity benefits. Hodes Survey, supra
note 47, at app. table VII.
67. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
68. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 56 (only 72% provide formal reemploy-
ment guarantee); see also BNA Survey, supra note 47, at 25 (86% of employers provide
the same or a comparable job on return from maternity leave).
69. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 56-57.
70. See BNA Survey, supra note 47, at 25. The same effect occurs if an employer
limits the maximum period of leave. According to the BNA Survey, approximately 25%
of the employers limit leave to one to four months, 25% provide leave for five to nine
months, and 10% permit leave of one to two years. Id. at 24.
71. For instance, a comparable job may mean a similar position at a different facility
of the employer. See Maternity Policies, supra note 25, at 108.
72. Reinstatement by its nature presumes preservation of seniority, but it is possible
that an employer's policies concerning loss of seniority after extended absence from work
might undercut this assumption. Even if seniority is assured, consideration for things like
promotion and transfer could be affected particularly where these are not seniority-based.
It is not common practice to continue accumulation of seniority during leave: only
approximately half of employers count leave time toward accrued seniority, and of those,
half count this time for seniority only and do not credit it toward vacation leave or pen-
sion, health or insurance benefits. See BNA Survey, supra note 47, at 25. But see Mater-
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universal, many employers provide no maternity leave or maintain poli-
cies that in effect may provide no leave or seriously inadequate leave.
Furthermore, some leave policies may incorporate invalid and outmoded
stereotypes about parenting and child-rearing. The lack of adequate ma-
ternity leave policies has a devastating impact on women's employment
opportunities by continuing to impose serious employment detriments on
the basis of pregnancy, as well as reinforcing the primary parenting role
of women.
II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
OF MATERNITY LEAVE
Given the lack of adequate leave policies under the current employ-
ment structure, and the disproportionate impact of those policies on wo-
men workers because of pregnancy, the question is how this difference
between the sexes may be legally taken into account in order to remedy
the problem. Whether sex differences should be taken into account at all
in defining discrimination or the concept of equality has been a matter of
considerable debate among scholars and feminists.73 Two primary ap-
proaches exist: the equal treatment model and the sex differences
model.74 The equal treatment model refuses to recognize sex differences
nity Policies, supra note 25, at 60-61 (when fringe benefits are provided, they continue
during leave, although some employers may require employee contribution).
73. See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
74. A third theoretical position on the issue of sex differences is the assimilationist
approach, but it seems to be foreclosed under constitutional and statutory analysis. The
assimilationist position is that sex should have no legal significance as a basis for differen-
tiation; sex should be no more significant than eye color. See Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 963 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Law II]; Scales,
Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375, 428 (1981); Wasserstrom, Racism,
Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 581,
606 (1977). Few, if any, differences between the sexes are significant, according to this
view, although it is conceded that pregnancy is one of them. Scales, supra, at 429; see also
Wasserstrom, supra, at 611-12 (although pregnancy is a genuine difference, it is limited to
the time in utero). Therefore, it is preferable that no differences be recognized in order to
preserve the simplicity and lack of ambiguity of the concept of equality. See Wasser-
strom, supra, at 607.
Under the assimilationist model, the maternity leave statutes would clearly be unlawful
sex-specific legislation. Although this result removes ambiguity and ensures simplicity in
discrimination theory, it seems to exalt theoretical form over substantive equality. Fur-
thermore, as commentators have noted, the model fails to articulate what this gender-
neutral model of equality is; one suspects it may be assimilation of women into an existing
male-defined model. See Scales, supra, at 430; Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual
Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 487, 487-88 (1981). But even if the model is truly gender-
neutral, its proscription of gender conscious action to achieve a gender "unconscious"
society seems destined only to preserve current reality under the guise of promoting this
ideal.
Finally, the Supreme Court seems to have rejected the assimilationist approach under
the constitutional test used for sex discrimination, see, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-99 (1976) (use of overt gender differences can be sustained if the classifications serve
important government interests and are substantially related to those interests); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1974) (statute authorizing more favorable treatment for
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on the grounds that those differences can be compared by means of anal-
ogy.75 The analysis of discrimination rests on finding a common denomi-
nator for comparison of men and women, and then determining whether
that comparison yields disparate, differential treatment of either gender
based on the common factor.76 The common denominator for pregnancy
is to treat it as a disability that can be compared with other temporary
disabilities. Thus, the appropriate means for dealing with the issue of
maternity leave is to provide leave for all temporary disabilities."
widow than widowers held constitutional), and even has rejected it under the strict scru-
tiny test used for race discrimination, see, e.g., Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 320 (1978) (racial classifications could be upheld on a showing that "the challenged
classification is necessary to promote a substantial state interest"). Under Title VII anal-
ysis such an approach is foreclosed both by the language of the statute, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982) (bona fide occupational qualification exception for sex discrimina-
tion), and by judicial decision, see United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
208 (1979). Professor Herma Hill Kay, on the other hand, argues that the Court has
primarily incorporated an assimilationist view of equality in its discrimination analysis,
particularly with respect to race discrimination. See Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 39, 40-43.
75. See, e.g., Pregnancy Discrimination, Civil Liberties 8 (Spring 1985) (membership
newsletter of the American Civil Liberties Union) (policy statement adopted by ACLU
Board of Directors) [hereinafter cited as Pregnancy Discrimination]; Ginsburg, Gender
and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 35-36 (1975); Ginsburg, Realizing the Equality
Principle, in Social Justice and Preferential Treatment 135, 143-48 (Blackstone & Heslep
eds. 1977); Koontz, supra note 36, at 481-82, 495-97, 501-02; Taub I, supra note 40, at
381-83; Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treat-
ment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 325-32, 351-70 (1984-85) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Williams I].
76. Williams I, supra note 75, at 329-32.
77. Taub I, supra note 40, at 382-83; Williams I, supra note 75, at 327; see also Note,
Love's Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 260,
295-97 (1972) (absence for maternity leave must be equivalent to "leaves accorded any
other temporary physical disability"). An even more desirable alternative would be the
implementation of national legislation ensuring disability and parenting leave. Two re-
cent studies have urged the enactment of such legislation. The Yale Committee on Infant
Care Leave advocates providing maternity disability leave and parental leave for a mini-
mum of six months with job protection, benefit continuation and 75% salary replacement
for a period of three months during leave. Recommendations of Yale Advisory Committee
on Infant Day Care Leave, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. F-I (BNA) (Dec. 2, 1985). The
Economic Policy Council of UNA-USA advocates, as part of a wide-ranging set of rec-
ommendations on family policy, enactment of federal temporary disability insurance leg-
islation covering all employees, job protection for temporarily disabled employees, and
the voluntary adoption by employers of unpaid job-protected parenting leave for a period
of up to six months. See Work and Family, supra note 7, at 12-13.
Such legislation was introduced in the 99th Congress by Rep. Patricia Schroeder. Her
bill, H.R. 2020, provides unpaid disability leave for a minimum of 26 weeks, see H.R.
2020, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a), (b) (1985) (available in the files of Fordham Law
Review), and unpaid parental leave for a minimum of 18 weeks, see id. at § 103 (a), (b),
with both types of leave protected by reinstatement to the same job on the employee's
return to work, see id. § 104(a). The bill also provides for a study to recommend imple-
mentation of a paid disability and parental leave policy, see id. §§ 201-205. The bill was
referred to four subcommittees, with hearings held in the Fall of 1985. Letter from Rep.
Schroeder to author (August 19, 1985) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review).
After the hearings in the Fall, the bill was redrafted as H.R. 4300, the Parental and
Medical Leave Act of 1986, and was introduced on March 3, 1986. Hearings on this bill
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According to this view, the problem with a differences approach is that
the concept of sex differences reflects a stereotyped view of the sexes and
could be used just as easily to deny equality as it could be used to pro-
mote equal opportunity.7" Gender-specific legislation therefore is objec-
tionable for two reasons. First, such legislation is underinclusive and
discriminates against men by assuming that the need for job-protected
disability leave is felt exclusively by women.79 Second, the treatment of
pregnancy as a "special" condition requiring unique legislative action
perpetuates patriarchal and paternalistic stereotypes of pregnancy as a
condition different from any other temporary disability."0
are scheduled in the spring of 1986. Telephone interview with Maureen Maxwell, legisla-
tive aide to Rep. Schroeder (Mar. 20, 1986).
Such legislation would begin to bring the United States into conformity with the poli-
cies of other advanced industrialized nations, which have long provided maternity leave
with reinstatement and partial or complete wage replacement. See S. Kamerman, Mater-
nity and Parental Benefits and Leaves: An International Review 11, 14 (1980). On the
other hand, to the extent other countries provide both disability and parental leave, the
parental leave aspect is, with the exception of Sweden, confined to mothers, thus perpetu-
ating parenting stereotypes. Id. at 14, 16, 45.
If such legislation is enacted in the United States, women are far more likely to benefit
from the parental leave aspect of the statute than men because under current child care
arrangements they are more likely to take parental leave. See supra notes 6-8 and accom-
panying text. Gender neutral parental leave legislation would at least ensure, however,
that this socially-imposed gender role would not have a disproportionately negative effect
on women, and a gender neutral statute would avoid the legal perpetuation of that social
role resulting from a gender specific statute. At the same time, a gender neutral statute
would encourage fathers to take parental leave by affirmatively providing this benefit.
78. See Pregnancy Discrimination, supra note 75, at 8; Williams, The Equality Crisis."
Some Reflections On Culture, Courts; and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 195-96
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Williams II]; Taub, Book Review, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1686,
1690-93 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Taub II].
79. See Williams I, supra note 75, at 327, 359 n.130; cf. L. Kanowitz, Equal Rights:
The Male Stake 18 ("disapproval of sex-based benign discrimination need not deprive
women of many of the special benefits they might enjoy under present or future law; it
could. . . simply mean that men too would enjoy these same benfits").
80. See Williams I, supra note 75, at 371-72; Williams II, supra note 78, at 196-98; see
also Scales, supra note 74, at 431-34 (doctrine of special rights could provide the basis for
legislation that would "play into stereotyped notions about womanhood"). According to
this view, the maternity leave statutes are simply a new version of protective labor legisla-
tion that should be struck down because they are based on a view of women as individu-
als requiring special protection. See Williams I, supra note 75, at 371-72; Williams II,
supra note 78, at 196 & n.114.
The flaws of this argument are twofold. First, the maternity leave statutes operate to
confer a benefit to ensure equal employment opportunity for women, and therefore do not
have the effect of the older protective statutes of limiting women's employment opportu-
nities. A different case would be presented if the statutes required mandatory maternity
leave. See supra notes 36, 44. Second, where the statutes are intended to compensate for
actual disability associated with pregnancy and childbirth which operates to disadvantage
women, and therefore are based on the existence of a real condition, they are not based on
presumed or stereotypical assumptions about the disabling effects of pregnancy or the
appropriate social roles of women. To the extent that the statutes provide parental or
child-rearing leave, however, they reinforce invalid stereotypes of men and women. See
supra note 40. This does not undercut, however, the validity of the statutes with respect
to disability-related leave.
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The sex differences approach, on the other hand, requires that real
differences between the sexes, such as pregnancy, be taken into account
in order to achieve actual equality of opportunity."1 According to this
view, the equal treatment or comparative model of discrimination simply
does not provide a fair basis of comparison where the use of either sex as
the standard for comparison may operate to disadvantage the other sex . 2
Instead of using comparative analysis, this approach focuses on the struc-
ture of the workplace, and whether that structure advances or inhibits
equal opportunity where the sexes are not similarly situated. 3 This re-
quires determining whether the employer's conduct or policy bars equal
participation in the workforce because of differences between individuals
that are related only to their sex,84 or whether the employer has incorpo-
rated policies into the workplace that benefit some individuals or hinder
others only because of their sex differences.8 5 Second, it focuses on elimi-
nating those barriers in the workplace that are based on invalid stereo-
types or stigmas,8 6 while permitting policies that restructure the
workplace to take into account actual differences affecting the ability to
compete equally in the workplace.8 7
81. See, e.g., C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 101-02, 110-11
(1979); E. Wolgast, Equality and the Rights of Women 14-16, 42 (1980); Fineman, m-
plementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 789,
817-18; Freedman, supra note 7, at 927-29, 931-40; Kay, supra note 74, at 40, 87-88;
Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and
the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 Golden Gate Univ. L. Rev. 513, 560, 563-64
(1983); Larson, Sex Discrimination As To Maternity Benefits, 1975 Duke L.J. 805, 827-28;
Law II, supra note 74, at 1007-08; Scales, supra note 74, at 435-42; Wildman, The Legiti-
mation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63
Or. L. Rev. 265, 304-06 (1984).
82. Kay, supra note 74, at 44, 87-88; Scales, supra note 74, at 427-28; Wildman, supra
note 81, at 267. See also A. Dworkin, Renouncing Sexual "Equality" in Our Blood:
Prophecies and Discourses on Sexual Politics 10, 11-12 (1976) (equality does not mean
simply exchanging the female role for the male one).
83. See Wildman, supra note 81, at 267-68; see also Larson, supra note 81, at 827-28
(maternity leave must be offered to women if the workplace is to become equal); Powers,
Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L.
Rev. 55, 106 ("the terms of work ... must be realigned to facilitate the equal participa-
tion of women and men . . .") [hereinafter cited as Powers I].
84. Cf. Wildman, supra note 81, at 304-06 (biological differences must be considered
in order to achieve equality in society).
85. Cf Scales, supra note 74, at 437-42 (proposing various methods of restructuring
the workplace to take into account inherent differences).
86. See C. MacKinnon, supra note 81, at 101-02; see also Law II, supra note 74, at
1008-09 (whether the policy "[perpetuates] either the oppression of women or culturally
imposed sex-role constraints on individual freedom"); Wildman, supra note 81, at 269
("Any treatment which stigmatizes women or restricts their choice of social role, particu-
larly that which would necessarily confine women to the private sphere, is offensive to the
achievement of equal protection."); cf. Powers I, supra note 83, at 102 (discrimination on
the basis of sex is defined as "socially imposed barriers to the equal participation of wo-
men and men").
87. Such calls for explicit gender consideration in fashioning rules . . . . focus
on an analysis of existing institutional structures and their historical inadequa-
cies in incorporating women, and not on the different and therefore implicitly
"deficient" characteristics of women as a group. Difference of treatment is
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Under the sex differences approach, while the maternity leave issue
could be resolved by enacting a gender-neutral disability leave statute,
gender-specific maternity leave legislation would also be a permissible
means to ensure that women are not additionally burdened because of
pregnancy by inadequate leave policies. If such legislation is limited to
providing leave for actual disability, it neither incorporates nor perpetu-
ates cultural stereotypes, but rather is based on physiological differences
mandating that leave be provided.
Thus the equal treatment and sex differences approach recognize that
there are differences betwen the sexes, but they reach contradictory con-
clusions concerning what the legal significance of those differences
should be. The linchpin of the equal treatment approach is that preg-
nancy is always analogous to other temporary disabilities and therefore
any differential treatment of pregnancy constitutes unlawful preference
by singling out a gender-specific disability for special treatment. What
this seems to ignore is the disproportionate impact of pregnancy within
the range of potential temporary disabilities under an employment struc-
ture that may provide no disability benefits, or inadequate benefits."8
Indeed, this approach seems to sacrifice a concern with the effect of
"4equal" treatment in favor of deemphasizing sex differences. Further-
more, it appears to assume that the level of equal treatment required is
defined by the treatment of males. In other words, discrimination is de-
fined by the existing structure of employee benefits, which are premised
on a male model.8 9 In contrast, the sex differences approach is the theo-
retical basis for restructuring the workplace to take into account actual
differences that affect women's ability to compete equally.9" This ap-
proach permits, even encourages, policies favoring one sex in order to
achieve actual equalization of employment opportunity. It therefore
measures equality not by determining whether women derive the same
therefore desirable not because of women's inherently different internal quali-
ties, but because of the discriminatory qualities of the institutions with which
they must deal.
Fineman, supra note 81, at 818; see also E. Wolgast, supra note 81, at 14-15 (women alone
bear children and a just society will take that difference into account); Kreiger & Cooney,
supra note 81, at 563-64 (society can best equalize the relative positions of men and wo-
men by recognizing the existence of inherent sex differences).
88. See supra notes 47-64.
89. If, on the other hand, the equal treatment model supports an attack on the struc-
ture because it favors one sex, then presumably it would require a structure that is gen-
der-neutral. See Williams I, supra note 75, at 362-70 (suggesting that correct application
of the equal treatment approach requires redefining the typical employee to include fe-
male traits as well as male ones). Under this analysis, the maternity leave statutes could
not be upheld in their current sex-specific form, but could conceivably be upheld if the
same benefits were extended to all temporary disabilities. Cf. L. Kanowitz, supra note 79,
at 51-58 (rather than invalidating statutes, laws written for women only should be ex-
tended to males). To some extent, however, this requires taking sex differences into ac-
count, in order to assess whether the current structure has a disparate impact on either
sex and what form any new, gender-neutral structure should have to ensure true equality
of treatment.
90. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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benefits or detriments as men, but rather whether the structure of the
workplace equally affects men and women in terms of employment op-
portunity. Thus, use of a sex differences approach will guarantee that
within the current workplace structure men and women are actually
equal.
At the same time, the sex differences approach limits this equalization
of oppportunity to real differences between the sexes, such as preg-
nancy.91 It is not an approach permitting differential treatment on the
basis of cultural stereotypes or socially-imposed gender roles; to the con-
trary, it limits the equalization of sex differences to those means that do
not incorporate or perpetuate sex stereotypes.
The most compelling justification for the differences approach is that it
focuses on the goal of actual equality in order to achieve equal employ-
ment opportunity. This equality of result contrasts with the concept of
equality as synonymous with sameness, which lies at the heart of the
equal treatment model. A concept of equality that focuses on the end
result comports with the policy goal of eliminating sex as a factor in
employment decisions. It also recognizes that such a goal can only be
achieved by first taking sex differences into account.92 It can only be
done, therefore, by confronting structural discrimination in the
workplace.
III. STATE MATERNITY LEAVE PROVISIONS
The structural discrimination created by the lack of adequate mater-
nity leave policies has been resolved in a minority of states by the enact-
ment of statutes or regulations requiring that all employers provide job-
protected maternity leave. It is important to examine these provisions
from two perspectives. First, to what extent do they provide a guarantee
of at least minimally adequate job-protected leave to women workers.
Second, if they are to be justified under the sex differences approach,
these provisions must be analyzed to determine whether they are based
solely on real differences between the sexes, and whether they achieve the
goal of ensuring equal opportunity without incorporating or perpetuating
sex stereotypes or gender roles.
A. Overview
Maternity leave is guaranteed by statute in five states and Puerto
Rico, 93 while an equal number of states impose such a requirement by
regulation or guideline issued pursuant to state antidiscrimination stat-
91. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
92. Cf Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race.").
93. The states are California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Montana and Wisconsin.
For the text of these provisions, as well as the Puerto Rico statute, see infra notes 101-02,
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utes.94 Another seven states regard the absence of maternity leave or
inadequate leave as a violation of state antidiscrimination laws.9"
All of these provisions require only unpaid leave, although if an em-
ployer provides benefits under a sick leave or disability plan, benefits
must be paid for pregnancy-related disability to the same extent as other
illnesses or disabilities. 96 The duration of leave is defined in most in-
stances by the period of actual disability, although some states recognize
a presumed period of disability or impose a maximum period of leave.97
109, 119, 126 and 139. For discussion of these statutes, see infra text accompanying
notes 101-42.
In addition to these statutory provisions requiring most public and private employers
to provide maternity leave, California and Puerto Rico specifically require maternity
leave for public sector employees. See infra notes 109 and 126. Several other states,
which do not generally guarantee maternity leave, nevertheless require that maternity
leave be granted to state employees or to teachers. See, e.g., Alaska Stat.
§ 39.20.225(b)(4) (1984) (state employees entitled to a maximum of nine weeks leave for
disability due to pregnancy and childbirth; leave is with pay to the extent the employee
has accrued personal leave); Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-852 (1982) (public school teachers
entitled to a maximum of one year's leave of absence for pregnancy and childbirth; if
leave is only for period of disability, employee is entitled to reinstatement to substantially
equivalent position; if leave extends beyond period of disability, employee is entitled to
hiring preference); Ind. Code Ann. § 20-6.1-6-4 (Burns 1985) (public school teachers en-
titled to leave from commencement of pregnancy until one year after birth of child); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:48(A) (West 1982) (teachers in special schools entitled to leaves of
absence for reasonable time before and after childbirth); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law Rules &
Regs. § 22.1(a) (McKinney 1983) (civil service employees may be granted unpaid leave
for two years for pregnancy and childbirth); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-5-702, -705 (1983)
(teachers are entitled to unpaid leave for maternity or adoption; if teacher returns within
12 months, reinstatement to the same position is guaranteed; if teacher returns after 12
months, reinstatement to the same or comparable position is guaranteed). Although the
statutes or ordinances of subdivisions of state governments may also provide maternity
leave, I have not conducted a search for these provisions. Federal employees whose em-
ployment is governed by the Civil Service Commission are entitled to maternity leave,
which may be a combination of sick pay, annual leave and leave without pay. Basic
Federal Personnel Manual, Subchapter 13, at 630-29 (1975). There is no separate cate-
gory of maternity leave. Id. Male employees may request annual leave or leave without
pay for the purpose of paternity leave. Id. at 630-30.
The legal issues surrounding the validity of the more limited state maternity leave stat-
utes are essentially the same as those concerning the broader state maternity leave provi-
sions. Because some of these provisions permit a leave beyond the period of pregnancy-
related disability, however, these statutes may be more vulnerable to challenge on the
grounds that providing such childeare or parenting leave solely to female employees dis-
criminates on the basis of invalid sex stereotypes. See supra note 40.
94. The five states are Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire and Washington.
For the text of these provisions and a discussion of the regulations, see infra notes 144-47
and accompanying text.
95. The seven states are Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma and
Rhode Island. For the text of these provisions and a discussion of the regulations, see
infra note 148 and accompanying text.
96. This is required by the state statutes or regulations, see supra notes 93-95, as well
as by Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)(1982)).
97. See infra text accompanying notes 103, 111, 120 and 126-29. States requiring
"reasonable leave" for pregnancy-related disability include Connecticut, Montana, Ha-
waii, Illinois, New Hampshire and Washington. Massachusetts provides a maximum of
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Furthermore, some states limit the leave period solely to childbirth-re-
lated disability, rather than including all pregnancy-related disability.
Reinstatement is explicitly protected to some degree by a majority, but
by no means all, of these provisions,99 as is the maintenance of pre-leave
seniority, benefits and job status."°
B. Statutory Provisions
Connecticut' and Montana 10 2 have virtually identical maternity
eight weeks, which all employees are entitled to take; California imposes a four month
maximum; Puerto Rico provides eight weeks for normal pregnancy.
98. Massachusetts and Kansas limit leave to disability after childbirth. See infra
notes 119-22 and 145.
99. See infra text accompanying note 146 and 148-49.
100. See infra text accompanying note 146.
101. The Connecticut statute provides, in relevant part:
[It shall be discriminatory] [flor an employer, by himself or his agent:...
(B) to refuse to grant to that employee a reasonable leave of absence for disabil-
ity resulting from her pregnancy; (C) to deny to that employee, who is disabled
as a result of pregnancy, any compensation to which she is entitled as a result of
the accumulation of disability or leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans main-
tained by the employer; (D) to fail or refuse to reinstate the employee to her
original job or to an equivalent position with equivalent pay and accumulated
seniority, retirement, fringe benefits and other service credits upon her signify-
ing her intent to return unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's
circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do
so; ....
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7) (Supp. 1985).
The maternity leave provision is contained within Connecticut's Fair Employment
Practices Act, which prohibits sex discrimination as well as discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religious creed, age, marital status, national origin, ancestry, mental disorder,
mental retardation or physical disability, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(l)-(3), (6)
(1983). Sex discrimination is defined in the statute as including discrimination on the
basis of "pregnancy, child-bearing capacity, sterilization, fertility or related medical con-
ditions." Id. § 46a-51(17). The act protects against pregnancy discrimination by provid-
ing, in addition to the requirement of maternity leave, that employers may not fire an
employee because of pregnancy, id. § 46(a)-60(a)(7)(A), and must make reasonable efforts
to temporarily transfer an employee to avoid health risks to the pregnant employee or the
fetus. Id. § 46a-60(a)(7)(E).
The maternity leave provision was added as an amendment to the statute in 1973. Pub.
Act No. 73-647 (1973) (codified as amended at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7) (1983)).
The available legislative history indicates that the amendment was enacted as a result of
concern over numerous court decisions in the early 1970's which held that employers
must include pregnancy within sick leave and disability plans. It was also viewed as a
logical step after passage in 1973 of the state equal rights amendment. See Debates on
Conn. H.B. 9195, at 3952 (Apr. 24, 1973) (remarks of Rep. Matthews); Debates on Conn.
S.B. 1565, at 151, 156 (Mar. 2, 1973) (remarks of Howard Orenstein, attorney for Con-
necticut Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities) (available in the files of the Ford-
ham Law Review).
102. The Montana maternity leave statute is a separate statute apart from the state's
comprehensive fair employment statute. It provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for an employer or his agent to ...
(2) refuse to grant to the employee a reasonable leave of absence for such
pregnancy;
(3) deny to the employee who is disabled as a result of pregnancy any compen-
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leave statutes that provide the broadest guarantee of leave and the
strongest protection of job security of any of the state statutes. The stat-
utes contain three essential provisions. First, public and private employ-
ers must provide a "reasonable" period of leave for pregnancy-related
disability.'03 Because leave must be provided for all pregnancy-related
disability, leave must be provided both during pregnancy and after child-
birth as long as the employee is actually disabled, with no limit on the
maximum period of leave. Leave is unpaid, unless the employer volun-
tarily maintains a temporary disability program and the employee is enti-
tled to accrued benefits under the plan."
Second, the statutes guarantee reinstatement to the same or to an
"equivalent" job on the employee's return from leave. s05 What consti-
tutes an "equivalent" position is not defined, but at a minimum would
probably require the same compensation and comparable job status, re-
sponsibilities and advancement opportunities as the employee's prior
positon. Private employers may be excused from the reinstatement re-
quirment only if "circumstances have so changed as to make it impossi-
sation to which she is entitled as a result of the accumulation of disability or
leave benefits accrued pursuant to plans maintained by her employer, provided
that the employer may require disability as a result of pregnancy to be verified
by medical certification that the employee is not able to perform her employ-
ment duties; or
(4) require that an employee take a mandatory maternity leave for an unreason-
able length of time.
Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-310 (1985). As to reinstatement, the statute continues:
Upon signifying her intent to return at the end of her leave of absence, such
employee shall be reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with
equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits, and other
service credits unless, in the case of a private employer, the employer's circum-
stances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.
Id. § 49-2-311.
The Montana statute was enacted as a result of the passage of an equal rights amend-
ment to the state constitution in 1972. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4. After the passage of the
state ERA, the Montana legislature passed two joint resolutions to establish a committee
to review existing statutes and propose amendments or new statutes consistent with the
equal rights amendment. Montana Legislative Council, Interim Study by the Subcomm.
on Judiciary: Equality of the Sexes 1 (Dec. 1974). Thirteen bills were drafted by a sub-
committee established for that purpose, including a fair employment practices law and
the maternity leave statute. Id. at 2-4.
Notes of the proceedings of the Labor and Employment Relations Committee, which
considered the leave statute, indicate that the only major objection to the bill was cost.
Minutes, Labor and Employment Relations Comm. Montana State Senate 2 (Feb. 3,
1975); id at 3 (Feb. 5, 1975) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review). The
minutes also indicate that a motion was made to amend the bill to include paternity leave,
but for reasons not clear from the legislative history, such a provision was not incorpo-
rated in the final bill. IaL at 3 (Feb. 3, 1975).
103. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(B) (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-310(2)
(1985).
104. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(C) (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-310(3)
(1985). See also supra note 96.
105. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D) (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-311
(1985).
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ble or unreasonable to do so."'' 6 Whether this exception implies the
equivalent of a business necessity defense 0 7 or some lesser standard is
unclear. Finally, the statutes provide that the employee's wages, senior-
ity, benefits and service credits on return from leave will be equivalent to
pre-leave levels. 108
The California maternity leave statute, 09 which is currently under re-
106. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D) (West Supp. 1985); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 49-2-311 (1985).
107. The business necessity standard is derived from Title VII litigation, and provides
that a facially neutral policy that has a disparate impact on the basis of race, sex, religion
or national origin is lawful only if the employer can demonstrate that it is necessary or
essential to the safe or efficient operation of the business. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971). Furthermore, cost is not a factor that can be the basis of
such a defense. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
716-17 (1978). If this is the standard incorporated in the maternity leave statute, it would
require that the employer demonstrate that it was necessary or essential to fill the em-
ployee's position with a permanent replacement or to eliminate the position, and that no
comparable position is available to which the employee can be reinstated.
If, on the other hand, the inclusion of the term "unreasonable" is intended to create a
different standard, it may only mean the employer must demonstrate a rational business
reason for failure to reinstate the employee, which might include cost considerations. Cf
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (interpreting the "factor
other than sex" defense of the Equal Pay Act to mean the employer must have an accept-
able business reason for a facially neutral salary practice that has an adverse impact on
women).
108. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7)(D) (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-311 (1985).
109. The California statute provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to refuse to allow a female employee who is pregnant:
To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time; pro-
vided, such period shall not exceed four months. Such employee shall be enti-
tled to utilize any accrued vacation leave during this period of time. Reasonable
period of time means that period during which the female employee is disabled
on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
The statute is contained within the state's comprehensive anti discrimination law, the
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12900-12996 (West
1980 & Supp. 1986). In addition to this general provision, California has separate leave
provisions for the following public sector employees: 1) state employees, Cal. Gov't Code
§ 19991.6 (West Supp. 1986) (female employees given unpaid leave for purposes of preg-
nancy, childbirth or recovery from childbirth for a period up to one year; male spouse or
parent given unpaid leave not to exceed one year to care for a newborn child; male or
female employees given unpaid leave not to exceed one year for adoption of a child);
2) state university employees, Cal. Educ. Code § 89519(a) (West Supp. 1986) (leave for
pregnancy, childbirth or recovery from childbirth not to exceed one year); 3) community
college employees, id. § 88193 (West 1978) (leave may be granted for pregnancy or con-
valescence following childbirth; rules and regulations may be adopted concerning proof
of pregnancy, time during pregnancy when leave shall be taken, and length of leave after
birth of child); 4) certified employees of public schools, id. § 44965 (leave provided for
period determined by employee and employee's physician); and 5) classified employees of
the public schools, id. § 45193 (leave may be granted, school board may adopt rules and
regulations concerning proof of pregnancy, time when leave shall be taken, whether leave
is paid and length of leave after birth of child). California also specifically prohibits
school boards from discharging employees due to inadequate leave policies that have a
disparate impact on the basis of sex. Cal. Gov't Code § 12943(b) (West 1980).
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view by the Supreme Court,"' is very similar to the Connecticut and
Montana statutes, although it is less explicit with respect to reinstate-
ment and protection of job status, and imposes a limit on the duration of
leave. California requires that employers provide a "reasonable" period
of pregnancy disability leave up to a maximum of four months.'
Although the statute does not expressly guarantee reinstatement after
leave, the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission has de-
cided that reinstatement to the same or a similar position is required
unless the employer can base refusal on a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation or business necessity. 1 2 Similarly, although the statute does not
expressly guarantee retention of pre-leave job status, the Commission's
guidelines require this.1I 3 The statute also states that employers may re-
quire reasonable notice of an employee's intention to take maternity
leave.' 14
Unlike employees covered by the Connecticut and Montana statutes,
California employees are likely to have some wage replacement during
leave. The California maternity leave statute provides that employees
may use accrued vacation leave, which may be paid leave, during mater-
nity leave." 5 More importantly, California is one of six jurisdictions
with a comprehensive temporary disability law providing income re-
placement to all eligible employees." 6 Amended in 1979 to include preg-
110. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986).
111. Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980). The statute also requires that em-
ployers who are not covered by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982) (employers with less
than 15 employees), and who have a disability policy, must provide a maximum of six
weeks of pregnancy related leave for "normal" pregnancy. Id. § 12945(b)(1), (e). If a
woman is disabled for more than six weeks, she is entitled to only the same coverage as is
generally provided for other disabled employees. Id
112. See Department of Fair Employment & Hous. v. Travel Express, No. FEP 80-81
A7-992s, N-18709, 83-17, slip op. at 8 (Cal. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n Au-
gust 4, 1983) (precedential decision holding that maternity leave statute implicitly re-
quires reinstatement) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Reviewv). The
Commission has incorporated this position into its proposed regulations. See Fair Em-
ployment Housing Commission, proposed regulation 7291.2. In pertinent part, the regu-
lations provide:
(B) The employee shall notify the employer as soon as she is ready and able to
return to work. Unless pursuant to a bona fide occupational qualification or
business necessity, the employer shall reinstate the returning employee to her orig-
inal or a substantially similar job, as defined in section 7291.2(b)(7), within a
reasonable period of time. There is a rebuttable presumption that a reasonable
period of time is not later than two weeks from the date of the employee's
notification.
Id R7291.2(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
113. Cal. Admin. Code § 7291.2(d)(3)(C)(6) (Vest 1983).
114. Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
115. See id
116. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 2625-2778 (West 1972 & Supp. 1986). The other five
jurisdictions with temporary disability statutes are: Hawaii, Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 392-1
to -101 (1976 & Supp. 1984); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 43:21-25 to -21-56 (West
1962 & Supp. 1985); New York, N.Y. Work. Comp. Law §§ 200-242 (McKinney 1965 &
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nancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, 1 1 7 the statute provides a
weekly benefit of $50 to $224 for a maximum of thirty-nine weeks." 8
The remaining three jurisdictions, Massachusetts, Wisconsin and
Puerto Rico, have uniquely structured statutes that vary significantly
from those previously discussed. The Massachusetts maternity leave
statute" 9 requires all employers to grant unpaid leave to non-probation-
Supp. 1986); Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, §§ 201-212 (1978 & Supp. 1984); and
Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-39-1 to -41-33 (1979 & Supp. 1985). All of these
statutes currently include pregnancy as a covered disability, see Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 392-
21(a) (1976); N.J. Stat. Ann. 43:21-29 (West 1962); N.Y. Work. Comp. Law § 201(9)(B)
(McKinney Supp. 1986); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 202(g) (Supp. 1984); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 28-39-2(14) (Supp. 1985), although with some limitations. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. 43-
21-29 (West 1962) (pregnancy covered during the four weeks immediately preceding the
expected birth of child and the four weeks immediately following the termination of preg-
nancy). For discussion of Puerto Rico's statute, see infra text accompanying notes 126-
38.
117. 1979 Cal. Stat. c. 663, p.2035, § 1(c). The amendment followed passage of the
PDA in 1978, which required inclusion of pregnancy in employer disability programs.
Earlier, the exclusion of pregnancy from the statute was upheld in Geduldig v. Aicllo,
417 U.S. 484, 494-97 (1974).
118. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 2653.5, 2655 (West Supp. 1986).
119. The Massachusetts statute provides:
A female employee who has completed the initial probationary period set by the
terms of her employment or, if there is no such probationary period, has been
employed by the same employer for at least three consecutive months as a full-
time employee, who is absent from such employment for a period not exceeding
eight weeks for the purpose of giving birth, or for adopting a child under three
years of age, said period to be hereinafter called maternity leave, and who shall
give at least two weeks' notice to her employer of her anticipated date of depar-
ture and intention to return, shall be restored to her previous, or a similar,
position with the same status, pay, length of service credit and seniority, wher-
ever applicable, as of the date of her leave. Said maternity leave may be with or
without pay at the discretion of the employer.
Such employer shall not be required to restore an employee on maternity
leave to her previous or a similar position if other employees of equal length of
service credit and status in the same or similar position have been laid off due to
economic conditions or other changes in operating conditions affecting employ-
ment during the period of such maternity leave; provided, however, that such
employee on maternity leave shall retain any preferential consideration for an-
other position to which she may be entitled as of the date of her leave.
Such maternity leave shall not affect the employee's right to receive vacation
time, sick leave, bonuses, advancement, seniority, length of service credit, bene-
fits, plans or programs for which she was eligible at the date of her leave, and
any other advantages or rights of her employment incident to her employment
position; provided, however, that such maternity leave shall not be included,
when applicable, in the computation of such benefits, rights, and advantages;
and provided, further, that the employer need not provide for the cost of any
benefits, plans, or programs during the period of maternity leave unless such
employer so provides for all employees on leave of absence. Nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect any bargaining agreement or company policy
which provides for greater or additional benefits than those required under this
section.
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 105 (D) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1986).
The Massachusetts maternity leave statute is a separate statute, not contained within
the state's comprehensive antidiscrimination statute, id. ch. 15lB. Failure to comply
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ary female employees for a maximum period of eight weeks "for the pur-
pose of giving birth."' 20 Unlike the prior state maternity leave statutes,
therefore, the Massachusetts provision is limited to childbirth leave,
rather than pregnancy-related leave. 2' Thus, if an employee is disabled
during pregnancy prior to childbirth, the statute does not require the
employer to provide leave.
Massachusetts' eight-week limitation on leave imposes a significant re-
striction on the amount of leave available to the individual employee. At
the same time, the interpretative regulations promulgated under the stat-
ute provide that every female employee may take eight weeks of leave
after childbirth regardless of actual disability." z In effect, therefore, the
eight week period is viewed as an entitlement to leave for actual disability
and parenting.
The statute guarantees reinstatement to the same or a "similar" posi-
tion after leave.' 23 The sole exception is where employees of similar sta-
tus have been laid off during the leave period, the employee is only
entitled to preferential consideration as job openings become available.' 2
The employee is also entitled to the same status and benefits as those
existing at the commencement of leave, but the statute specifically states
with ch. 149, § 105 (D), however, is actionable under the procedure set forth in the an-
tidiscrimination statute. Id. ch. 151B, § 4(1 1A) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985). Fur-
thermore, the coverage of § 105(D) includes all employers as defined under chapter 151 B,
which includes public and private employers with six or more employees. Id. § 1(5)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976).
120. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 105(D) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985). The em-
ployee is required to give a minimum of two weeks notice of the commencement of leave
and of her intention to return to work. Id.
121. Although there is no official legislative history for the statute, materials compiled
by the state library in connection with this bill confirm that it is solely a childbirth leave
statute: "The new law is the first of its kind in the country .... [Legislative recogni-
tion of childbirth as an overriding interest, is another example of the [state's] ... con-
cern with human rights." Statement of Massachusetts Law Reform Institute 2 (undated)
(excerpted from unpublished material relating to Senate Bill 1220, later ch. 149,
§ 105(D)) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Review). The statute was enacted in
1972, prior to passage of the state equal rights amendment, Mass. Const. art. I, in 1976.
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 1050D) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976).
122. Because the statute does not base entitlement to leave on disability, it implies that
every female employee may take leave after childbirth. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149,
§ 105(D) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1985). The regulations, issued in 1973, are
even clearer, stating that "if a disaiblity caused or contributed to by childbirth and recov-
ery therefrom is less than eights weeks duration or if a temporary leave policy of an
employer would result in a maternity leave of less than eight weeks, a female employee
who meets the requirements specified in c. 149, § 105D shall be entitled to an eight week
maternity leave." Mass. Commission Against Discrimination, rules issued May 24, 1973,
Section 3, reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 455:845, 455:845 (effective
May 24, 1973) (emphasis added).
This interpretation of the statute is also supported by the 1984 amendment to the stat-
ute requiring that the same period of leave be given to female employees "for adopting a
child under three years of age" as for giving birth. 1984 Mass. Adv. Legis. Ser'. ch. 423
(Law. Co-op.). The gender-specific adoption provision is a parental leave entitlement.
123. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 105(D) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1985).
124. 1d.
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that these benefits will not accrue during the period of leave. 125
Like the Massachusetts statute, the Puerto Rico maternity leave stat-
ute 26 provides combined disability and parental leave, and also requires
125. Id.
126. The Puerto Rico statute provides:
Pregnant working women shall be entitled to a rest which shall include four
(4) weeks before and four (4) weeks after the birth. The working woman may
opt to take only one (1) week of prenatal rest, and to extend up to seven (7)
weeks the postnatal rest she is entitled to, provided she presents a medical cer-
tificate to her employer showing that she is able to work until one (I) week
before childbirth. The physician shall take into consideration the kind of work
the working woman performs.
The employer shall, likewise, be under the obligation to pay the working
mother during said period of rest, half the salary, wages, day wages, or compen-
sation that she may be receiving for her work. This payment shall be made in
cash, at the time the working woman begins to enjoy maternity leave. Provided,
that the average salary . . . that she may have received during the six (6)
months immediately preceding the beginning of the period of rest shall be taken
as the sole basis for computing half the salary ....
Should the birth take place before the weeks during which the pregnant
working women shall enjoy her prenatal rest have elapsed, or without having
begun her rest, she may opt to extend the postnatal rest for a period of time
equivalent to what she failed to enjoy during the prenatal period, and it shall
also be paid to her on a half-salary basis; Provided, That the working mother
may request to be reinstated to her employment after the first two weeks of the
postnatal rest period, if a medical certificate accrediting that she is able to work
is presented to her employer. In this case, the working woman shall be consid-
ered to waive the other weeks of postnatal rest to which she is entitled. When
the probable date of the childbirth is mistakenly estimated, and the woman has
enjoyed four (4) weeks of prenatal rest without having given birth to the child,
she shall be entitled to have the prenatal leave extended on a half-salary basis,
until the childbirth occurs, in which case, the additional period for which the
prenatal rest is extended shall be paid in the same manner and terms established
for the payment of regular salaries .... If the working woman suffers any
postnatal complication and she is prevented from working after the four- (4)
weeks period, reckoning from the date of childbirth, the employer shall be
under the obligation to extend the rest period for a term which shall not exceed
twelve (12) additional weeks, provided that before the expiration of the rest
period, a medical certificate accrediting such facts is presented. In this case, the
working woman shall not be entitled to receive additional compensation, but
the employment shall be retained for her.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 467 (1985); see also id. § 468 (during the rest periods provided
in § 467, employer must keep position open for pregnant worker); id. § 469 (discharge for
pregnancy forbidden).
The Puerto Rico statute was originally enacted in 1942 as part of its laws regarding
women and employment, and amended in 1969, 1975 and 1982. 1982 P.R. Laws 12, 12-
13. According to the statement of motives in the 1942 legislation, the statute was enacted
because "[u]ninterrupted work during [the weeks preceding or following childbirth] con-
stitutes a positive danger to the health and life of the workers." Copy of Act No. 3 of
March 13, 1942, at 1 (sent to author by Dep't of Labor and Human Resources, Common-
wealth of P.R. (Oct. 17, 1985)) (unpublished) (available in the files of the Fordhamn Law
Review). The statute applies to all private employers and to women working in public
service enterprises. Id.
Puerto Rico separately provides similar leave protection to municipal employees and
teachers. Teachers are provided eight weeks leave with full pay, whether their status is
permanent, probational, substitute or provisional. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 18, § 218(a),
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a limited period of mandatory leave immediately after childbirth. 2 " This
is not surprising, however, because the statute was enacted in 1942, and
although it has since been amended, it still reflects paternalistic provi-
sions typical of earlier protectionist labor legislation." 8 The statute enti-
tles working women to a "rest" period of eight weeks, consisting of either
four weeks before and four weeks after childbirth, or one week before
and seven weeks after childbirth, regardless of actual disability during
that period. 129 Although an employee may opt to take a shorter period
of post-natal leave, she must present a medical certificate of her ability to
work, 130 and in any case she is barred from returning to work earlier
than two weeks after childbirth.' 3' In the event of post-natal complica-
tions disabling the employee beyond the ordinary leave period, the leave
period may be extended for a maximum of sixteen weeks from the date of
childbirth.1 32
Unlike the laws discussed previously, reinstatement rights are abso-
lutely protected under the statute during the leave period and cannot be
waived.1 33 No explicit protection is provided, however, for maintenance
of pre-leave seniority and benefits.' 3 4
The statute also provides for significant wage replacement during
leave: one-half of the employee's salary for the leave period must be paid
as a cash benefit at the commencement of the leave period. 35 In addi-
tion, Puerto Rico, like California, provides employees with benefits under
(c), (e) (1974 & Supp. 1984). Municipal employees are similarly entitled to eight weeks
leave at full pay, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 21, § 1553b(a) (1974), and, where the complica-
tions prevent the employee from returning to work after postnatal leave, an employee
may use sick leave, vacation and unpaid leave provided the total leave period does not
exceed one year, id. § 1553b(c).
127. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 467 (1985).
128. See supra notes 36 and 126 and text accompanying infra notes 252-56.
129. P.R- Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 467 (1985). The latter option is only provided if the
employee presents a medical certificate from her physician indicating her ability to work
until one week before childbirth. Id If childbirth occurs prior to the anticipated prena-
tal period, the statute entitles the employee to take the full eight weeks of leave after
childbirth. Id The statute also has a notice requirement. In order to be entitled to leave
the employee must present her employer a medical certicate attesting to her pregnancy.
Id § 470. This certificate must be issued free of charge by the employee's physician. Id.
130. Id § 467.
131. Id Permitting an employee to work before two weeks after childbirth is punish-
able as a misdemeanor. Id § 471.
132. See id § 467.
133. "During the rest periods referred to in the preceding section, the employer shall
be bound, notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, to keep the position open for
the pregnant worker." Id § 468. Failure to reinstate an employee after maternity leave
may subject an employer to a civil fine of double damages. Id. § 469. Failure to provide
leave, pay wages due or reinstate the employee are also punishable as misdemeanors. Id.
§ 471.
134. See id § 467.
135. Id The requirement that wage replacement be paid as a lump sum at the begin-
ning of leave, rather than according to the normal method of wage payment, was added
as an amendment to the statute in 1982. 1982 P.R. Laws, at 13.
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its temporary disability statute, 136 which provides compensation for
pregnancy disability for a maximum of twenty-six weeks.' 37 Although
the benefit amount is small, it nevertheless provides some wage
replacement. 
38
The final statute, the Wisconsin provision, 39 is the least explicit. In-
deed, it is questionable whether it is a maternity leave statute at all.
Under a 1981 amendment to its fair employment statute, Wisconsin de-
fines prohibited sex discrimination to include "[d]iscriminating against
any woman on the basis of. . .maternity leave."14 The state has not
issued any regulations further defining this statutory duty, nor have any
cases been litigated concerning this provision. Although the provison
seems to imply a guarantee of maternity leave, it is by no means clear to
what extent that protection extends.' 4 1 For example, it is not clear
whether maternity leave encompasses disability leave only or also in-
cludes parenting leave. Furthermore, the statute does not explicitly
guarantee reinstatement nor does it ensure retention of pre-leave job
status. 142
C. Regulatory Provisions
In contrast to the varied statutory provisions guaranteeing maternity
136. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, §§ 202-212 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
137. See id. §§ 202(g), 203(c). The statute as originally enacted specifically excluded
payment for disability due to pregnancy, see id. § 203(g)(2), but was amended in 1979 to
include pregnancy in the definition of "disability." 1979 P.R. Laws 527, 529 (codified as
amended at P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 202(g) (Supp. 1984)). Under that same amend-
ment, benefits will not be paid for disability arising from an abortion, unless the abortion
was performed for medically necessary reasons. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 203(g)(2)
(Supp. 1984).
138. See id. § 203(d) (benefit amounts and calculation). The employee is not entitled
to disability payments, however, during the period when the employee is receiving bene-
fits under the maternity leave statute, unless the maternity leave benefit is lower than tile
amount the employee would be entitled to receive under the disability statute. Id.
§ 203(i)(6).
139. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.36(1) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
Employment discrimination because of sex includes, but is not limited to, any
of the following actions by any employer, labor organization, employment
agency, licensing agency or other person:
(c) Discriminating against any woman on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth,
maternity leave or related medical conditions by engaging in any of the actions
prohibited under s. 111.322 [refusal to hire or employ, termination of employ-
ment, discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment], including, but not limited to, actions concerning fringe benefit
programs covering illnesses and disability.
140. Id.
141. Alternatively, the provision could be interpreted as not requiring maternity leave,
but only as a guarantee that if maternity leave is provided it cannot be the basis for
discriminatory treatment.
142. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 111.36(1) (West Supp. 1985). Reinstatement would argua-
bly be included within the discriminatory discharge provisions of the statute. See id.
§ .322(1).
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leave, states incorporating this guarantee in regulations or guidelines 4 '
issued pursuant to their state antidiscrimination laws follow one of two
basic frameworks. First, the regulations of several states (Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Kansas, New Hampshire and Washington)'" provide guarantees
similar to the Connecticut and Montana statutes: the regulations or
guidelines require employers to provide a period of leave for pregnancy-
related disability, 45 reinstatement to the same or to a similar position
and maintenance of pre-leave seniority, fringe benefits and job status.'4 6
In two of the states, an employer is expressly exempted from the require-
143. One obvious, but very fundamental, difference between these regulations or guide-
lines and the statutes previously discussed is that the regulations are far more susceptible
to modification or abandonment by the relevant state agency, and therefore constitute a
considerably less certain guarantee of maternity leave. Indeed, Rhode Island, according
to the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, is not publicizing or enforcing its
regulations. Telephone interview with Paul Holbrook, Director of Fair Housing Pro-
gram, Rhode Island (March 12, 1986).
144. See Hawaii, Administrative Rules on Sex Discrimination, § 12-23-58 (1983), re-
printed in 8A Fair Emp. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:2327, 453:2328-29 (effective Nov. 15,
1982); Illinois, Guidelines on Discrimination in Employment, § 2. 10, reprinted in 8A Fair
Empl. Prac. Manual (DNA) 453:2751, 453:2753-54; Kansas, Commission On Civil
Rights Rules and Regulations 1985, § 21-32-6, reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual
(BNA) 453:3301, 453:3311 (effective Jan. 1, 1974); New Hampshire, Rules of the New
Hampshire Commission for Human Rights, HUM 402.03 (1984), reprinted in 8A Fair
Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 455:2451, 455:2464 (as amended Nov. 15, 1984); Washing-
ton, Human Rights Commission Maternity Regulation, WAC 162-30-020(5) (1973), re-
printed in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 457:2951, 457:2951-52 (effective Oct. 28,
1973).
The language of these regulations is similar to the wording of the relevant provisions in
the current sex discrimination guidelines promulgated in 1970 and reissued in 1978 by
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). See 41 C.F.R. § 60-
20.3(g)(1), (2) (1985) ("childbearing must be considered by the employer to be a justifica-
tion for leave of absence for female employees for a reasonable period of time"). See also
infra note 148.
After passage of the PDA, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC)
issued guidelines concerning the new statute indicating that female employees were enti-
tled to only the same leave and disability benefits generally available to male employees.
See Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app.
(1985).
145. But see Kansas, Commission on Civil Rights Rules and Regulations 1985 § 21-
32-6(d), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:3301, 453:3311 (effective
Jan. 1, 1974) (limiting leave to childbirth-related disability).
146. See Hawaii, Administrative Rules on Sex Discrimination, § 12-23-58(a), (c)
(1983), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:2327, 453:2328-29 (effective
Nov. 15, 1982); Kansas, Commission on Civil Rights Rules and Regulations 1985, § 21-
32-6(d), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:3301, 453:3311-54 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1974); see also Illinois, Guidelines on Discrimination in Employment,
§ 2.10(B), (D) reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:2751, 453:2753-54
(guaranteeing seniority and fringe benefits only to extent provided under employer's tem-
porary disability plan); New Hampshire, Rules of the New Hampshire Commission for
Human Rights, HUM 402.03(a), (b) (1984), reprinted in 8A Fair Empi. Prac. Manual
(BNA) 455:2451, 455:2464 (as amended Nov. 15, 1984) (same); Washington, Human
Rights Commission Maternity Regulation, WAC 162-30-020(5)(a), (c), (6)(c) (1973), re-
printed in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 457:2951, 457:2952 (effective Oct. 28,
1973) (same).
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ment of reinstatement on a showing of business necessity.' 47
The balance of the states (Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Missouri, Ohio,
Oklahoma and Rhode Island) provide some guarantee of maternity leave
by indicating that they would consider an employer to be in violation of
the state antidiscrimination law if the failure to provide maternity leave
or inadequate leave has an adverse impact on women. 148 These regula-
tions therefore do not affirmatively require the maintenance of a mater-
nity leave policy, nor do they specify an employee's reinstatement or job
status rights. While they appear to ensure adequate leave, the require-
ment that the policy have an adverse impact on women in order to be
struck down may mean that an individual disabled beyond the "normal"
disability period may be unable to establish the right to a more extended
leave. 1
49
Two of the states guaranteeing maternity leave by regulation, Ha-
147. See New Hampshire, Rules of the New Hampshire Commission for Human
Rights, HUM 402.03(a) (1984), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA)
455:2451, 455:2464 (as amended Nov. 15, 1984); Washington, Human Rights Commis-
sion Maternity Regulation, WAC 162-30-020(5)(c) (1973), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl.
Prac. Manual (BNA) 457:2951, 457:2952 (effective Oct. 28, 1973). Even without express
recognition of a business necessity defense, such a defense implicitly is included by opera-
tion of judicial decision. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
148. See Colorado, Sex Discrimination Rules, Rule 80.8(c), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl.
Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:1125, 453:1128 (effective May 31, 1972); Iowa, Rules of Iowa
Civil Rights Commission, Iowa Admin. Code § 240, ch. 3.10(4) (1985), reprinted in 8A
Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 453:3075, 453:3098 (effective May 29, 1985); Maine,
Employment Regulations of the Maine Human Rights Commission, § 3.06(F)(4) (1985),
reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 455:525, 455:530 (effective Oct. 1,
1980); Missouri, Commission on Human Rights, Guidelines and Interpretations, Mo.
Code of State Regulations 180-3.040(16)(B), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual
(BNA) 455:1701, 455:1712 (as amended Feb. 2, 1981); Ohio, Civil Rights Commission
Rules, § 4112-5-05(G)(2) (1985), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA)
457:251, 457:268 (effective Dec. 23, 1979); Oklahoma, Human Rights Commission
Guidelines, V(I)(3), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 457:551, 457:555
(effective Feb. 25, 1977); Rhode Island, Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 7(b), reprinted in
8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 457:1275, 457:1276-77 (effective Nov. 1973). The
wording of the regulation is generally as follows:
Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused
by an employment policy under which insufficient or no [maternity] leave is
available, such a termination is unlawful if it has a disparate impact on employ-
ees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.
Id., reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) at 457:1276-77.
The language of these regulations follows that contained within the relevant provision
of the proposed revised sex discrimination guidelines of the OFCCP published in 1980, 45
Fed. Reg. 86,216 (1980), which have been indefinitely deferred. 46 Fed. Reg. 42,865
(1981).
149. In other words, the requisite showing of disproportionate impact may be difficult
to establish if only a small number of employees would be adversely affected by a leave
policy which is otherwise adequate for normal pregnancy disability. For an explanation
of disparate impact analysis, see infra note 219. Another problem with disparate impact
analysis is whether a right to leave could be asserted in a female-intensive (or exclusively
female) workforce, where there is no comparative pool of male workers. See, e.g., Re-
sponses, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 407, 408 (1984-85) (remarks of Joan Bertin).
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waii15° and Rhode Island,' also provide some wage replacement during
the period of disability under their temporary disability statutes.' 52 Ha-
waii, which couples this benefit with the more explicit maternity leave
regulation,"5 3 provides benefits equal to fifty-five percent of the average
weekly wage, if the wage is $26 or more"54 for a maximum period of
twenty-six weeks."' Rhode Island, which has the weaker disparate im-
pact regulation, 156 provids benefits equal to fifty-five percent of the indi-
vidual's average weekly wage'57 for a maximum period of thirty
weeks.15 8
D. Summary
The differences between these provisions should not obscure the fact
that they all generally ensure that employers provide the basic compo-
nents of adequate maternity leave, that is, a period of leave, reinstate-
ment, and protection of job status. Measured against the inadequacies of
employer maternity leave policies, as previously discussed,' 59 these stat-
utes resolve many of the problems identified with those policies. First,
virtually all of the provisions ensure that every woman worker is entitled
to some leave; only Massachusetts limits leave to non-probationary em-
ployees." 6 This resolves the problems of no-leave policies or eligibility
requirements that have the effect of providing no leave.' 6' Second, these
provisions protect the right to reinstatement at pre-leave status unless the
employer can demonstrate that reinstatement is impossible or not eco-
nomically feasible.1 62 This ensures that in most instances leave is with-
150. Hawaii, Administrative Rules on Sex Discrimination, § 12-23-58 (1983), reprinted
in 8A Fair Empl. Prac Manual (BNA) 453:2327, 453-2328-29 (effective Nov. 15, 1982).
See supra note 144 and text accompanying notes 144-47.
151. See Rhode Island, Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 7(a), reprinted in 8A Fair
Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 457:1275, 457:1276-77 (effective Nov. 1973). See also supra
notes 143, 148 and text accompanying supra notes 148-49.
152. See Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 392-3(5) (1976); RI. Gen. Laws §§ 28-39-2(14), -41-8
(Supp. 1985).
153. See Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 392-3(5) (1976); Hawaii, Administrative Rules on Sex
Discrimination Regulations, § 12-23-58 (1983), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Manual
(BNA) 453:2327, 453:2328-29 (effective Nov. 15, 1982).
154. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 392-22(1) (1976).
155. Id § 392-23.
156. See Rhode Island, Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 7(b), reprinted in 8A Fair
Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 457:1275, 457:1276-77 (effective Nov. 1973). See supra note
143.
157. RI. Gen. Laws § 28-41-5(A) (Supp. 1985).
158. Id § 28-41-7(B). The Rhode Island statute provides, however, that for purposes
of maternity disability an employee may elect to receive a lump sum benefit in lieu of
weekly benefits: if the employee is entitled to benefits totalling over S500, the lump sum
is $500; if the benefit entitlement total is less than S500, then only the lesser total can be
paid as a lump sum. Id. § 28-41-8.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 46-72.
160. See supra note 119.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 47-64.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47.
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out risk of job loss, a guarantee not present in many current leave
policies.' 63 At the same time, this takes into consideration legitimate em-
ployer concerns where a position cannot be temporarily filled or left va-
cant during the leave period, or has been eliminated, and a comparable
position is unavailable."6 Finally, the state provisions guarantee an ade-
quate period of leave for disability associated with normal pregnancy,
and the most liberal provisions ensure that leave will be provided for all
pregnancy-related disability. 6 '
Whether these provisions can be justified under the sex differences ap-
proach is a more complex issue. The goal of the provisions is to take into
account the unique burden imposed on women workers by no-leave or
inadequate leave policies by restructuring the workplace to require that
employers at a minimum provide leave for pregnancy. This goal there-
fore accords with the primary concern of the sex differences approach,
which is to achieve actual equality in the workplace. 166 Where these pro-
visions are premised on leave for pregnancy-related disability, they sat-
isfy the requirement of the sex differences approach that efforts at
equalization of the employment structure must be limited to real sex
differences. 67
On the other hand, to the extent that these provisions impose a maxi-
mum period on the duration of leave or limit leave to childbirth-related
disability, they may incorporate invalid assumptions about the nature of
pregnancy disability and therefore may be underinclusive in individual
cases.' 68 Moreover, where they mandate a fixed period of leave that may
extend beyond disability, in effect they are providing parenting leave on
the basis of socially-imposed gender roles, 169 which is a justification ex-
pressly condemned by the differences approach. 70
The question of the validity of these provisions ultimately depends,
163. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72. Where reinstatement is to a compara-
ble position, these provisions are no more clear than existing employer policies concern-
ing how the term comparable is defined. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
These provisions ensure, however, that the issue of comparability will be measured
against a judicial standard of reasonableness, rather than an individual employer's subjec-
tive judgment.
164. See supra note 24. The limitation of the reinstatement exception to a strict stan-
dard of business necessity, a relatively well-developed doctrine under Title VII, provides
both employers and employees with a reasonable standard. See supra note 107.
165. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
168. See supra note 40 and text accompanying notes 65-66. Mandatory leave, such as
the two-week period contained in the Puerto Rico statute, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29,
§ 467 (1985) (the working mother may only request to be reinstated after the first two
weeks of the postnatal rest period), similarly rests on invalid assumptions about preg-
nancy disability, see supra note 24, and, by creating an irrebuttable presumption of disa-
bility, would be unlawful under existing case law, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 644-46 (1974); Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 46
(1975).
169. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
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however, on whether their sex-specific approach, which takes into ac-
count differences between the sexes to ensure equal employment opportu-
nity, is permissible under equal protection' 7' and Title VII1 2 standards.
In other words, does constitutional and statutory sex discrimination
analysis encompass a sex differences approach that would essentially sup-
port these state provisions.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY ANALYSIS
OF SEX DIFFERENCES
A. Court Challenges to the State Maternity Leave Provisions
Two of the maternity leave provisions, the California'7 3 and Mon-
tana' 74 statutes, have been upheld against both equal protection and Title
VII challenges." 5 The Montana statute initially was declared valid by
the Montana federal district court in Miller- Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of
Labor & Industry (Miller-Wohl I).176 Although the court's opinion was
171. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
173. See Cal. Gov't Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
174. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 49-2-310, 311 (1985).
175. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus.,
515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981), vacated for lack ofjurisdiction and appeal dismissed,
685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Miller-Woh I]; Miller-Vohl Co. v.
Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984), appealfiled, 54 U.S.L.W.
3064-65 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (No. 84-1545) [hereinafter cited as Miller-Wohll1]; see also
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 187 Mont. 22, 51,
608 P.2d 1047, 1062-63 (1979) (upholding disability benefits portion of Montana mater-
nity leave statute), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
176. The Montana litigation in the Miller-Wohl suits arose out of the alleged discrimi-
natory discharge of a pregnant employee resulting from the employer's no-leave policy
for employees with less than one year of seniority. See Miller- Wold II, 692 P.2d at 1245,
1249-50. The employee discovered shortly after she was hired that she was pregnant. Id.
at 1245. She experienced "morning sickness" over several weeks, id., but was unable to
take sick leave or disability leave because of the company's policy that no sick leave or
leave of absence would be provided until an employee had worked for the company for
one year, id. at 1249. Unable to take any leave because of her brief time on the job, the
employee's illness affected her performance as a sales clerk, resulting in her discharge by
the company. Id. at 1245. The employee then filed a complaint with the State Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries (DLI) alleging that she had been unlawfully discharged
because of her pregnancy, and charging that the company's no-leave policy violated the
requirements of the Montana maternity leave statute. Id.
After the employee filed this complaint with the DLI against the employer, Miller-
Wohl II, 692 P.2d at 1245, the employer filed suit in federal court seeking a declaratory
judgment that the statute was invalid on the grounds that the statute was preempted by
the PDA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), and violated the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Miller-Wohl I, 515 F. Supp. at 1266. The district court's
decision upholding the statute was later vacated on jurisdictional grounds. See Miller-
Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 685 F.2d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1982) (no
federal jurisdiction because federal issues were only raised as defenses to plaintiff's state
law claims).
In the state court action, the trial court decided in favor of the Company, holding that
the statute violated both the equal protection clause and Title VII. Miller-Woh I1, 692
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later vacated on jurisdictional grounds,' its analysis is instructive be-
cause it was adopted in part in the subsequent opinion of the Montana
Supreme Court (Miller- Wohl II), which similarly upheld the statute.'
Four months after Miller- Wohl II, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Cali-
fornia statute was valid in California Federal Savings & Loan Association
v. Guerra.1"9 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the
California case,180 while the appeal of the Montana case is still pending
before the Court.'
Thus far, the opinions upholding the statutes fail to provide a satisfac-
tory rationale for this result under either constitutional or statutory anal-
ysis. Most significantly, the courts have utterly failed to address the
P.2d at 1246. The Montana Supreme Court reversed on both constitutional and statutory
grounds. Id. at 1254. An appeal of the Montana Supreme Court's decision has been filed
with the United States Supreme Court. 54 U.S.L.W. 3064-65 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (No.
84-1545).
177. See Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 695 F.2d 1088, 1091
(9th Cir. 1982).
178. See Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 692 P.12d 1243, 1254
(Mont. 1984).
179. 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986). The statute was
challenged after an employer refused to reinstate an employee at the expiration of her
maternity leave. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 562, 565 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The company's policies provided for leave, including
leave for pregnancy, but stated that an employee on leave could be terminated if "a simi-
lar and suitable position is not available." Id. The employee in this case was ready to
return to work in April, 1982, but no position was available until November, 1982. Id.
The California Federal Savings & Loan Association's policy also stated that leave benefits
were unavailable until an employee had worked for three months, and after 30 days of
leave, the following benefits would be affected: the employee's anniversary date, emer-
gency leave time accrual, insurance, retirement, salary review date and vacation accrual.
Id.
The employer filed suit in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of the state maternity leave statute on the ground that the statute was pre-
empted under Title VII. Guerra, 758 F.2d at 392-93. The employer also apparently
raised a claim under the ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983), which
was later dropped from the lawsuit. 758 F.2d at 393 n.5.
The district court agreed that the statute mandated preferential treatment of female
employees that conflicted with Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis
of sex, and declared the statute invalid. See Guerra, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
567-68. This preferential treatment, according to the court, is "inconsistent with the pur-
pose of Congress in enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to eliminate
classifications based on pregnancy and with the purpose of Title VII to provide equal
treatment for males and females." Id. at 568. Because of this inconsistency, it was im-
possible, in the court's view, for the employer to comply with both statutes. See id.
The Ninth Circuit vehemently disagreed with this analysis, finding that the district
court's ruling "defies common sense, misinterprets case law, and flouts Title VII and the
PDA." See Guerra, 758 F.2d at 393. The court declared that "equality under the PDA
must be measured in employment opportunity not . . . in amounts of days of disability
leave expended." Id. at 396. The number of days guaranteed was a "means to the goal of
[equal] employment opportunity." Id.
180. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986) granting cert.
to 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985).
181. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 54 U.S.L.W. 3064-65 (U.S.
Mar. 27, 1985) (No. 84-1545).
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treatment of sex differences that lies at the heart of the question of the
validity of these statutes. First, under equal protection analysis, t82 the
courts have had no difficulty concluding that the statutes are not discrim-
inatory under the Supreme Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello. 8 3 In
Geduldig the Court held that a state disability statute excluding preg-
nancy as a covered condition did not violate the equal protection
clause.184 According to the Court, pregnancy classifications are not per
se sex-based classifications.' 85 Rather, such classifications merely differ-
entiate between those who are pregnant (women) and those who are not
pregnant (men and women).'86 Therefore, the Court held, a pregnancy
classification is permissible unless it can be demonstrated that it is a pre-
text for sex discrimination, that is, that there is evidence of invidious
intent to discriminate on the basis of sex.187
Two courts that have examined one of the maternity leave statutes
under this standard have concluded that there is no evidence that the
statute constitutes a pretext for sex discrimination. 88 To the contrary,
no invidious discrimination exists with respect to the statute because its
purpose is not to disadvantage either sex, but rather is to ensure that
female employees are not uniquely disadvantaged by pregnancy. 189 The
statute removes a burden uniquely borne by women--disability from
pregnancy-in order to ensure equal employment opportunity.190 All
other disabilities are otherwise treated equally: employers are free to de-
182. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
183. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
184. See id at 496-97.
185. See id at 496 n.20.
186. Id
187. See id
188. See Miller-Wohl I1, 692 P.2d at 1254. The Montana Supreme Court adopted
verbatim the federal district court's analysis of the equal protection issue.
189. See Miller- Wohl 1, 515 F. Supp. at 1266. To the extent that legislative history is
available concerning the state statutes, it is clear that most of the statutes were enacted to
ensure equal employment opportunity by preventing any disadvantage caused by sexual
stereotypes or insensitivity to pregnant employees. See supra notes 101-02 and 121. But
see supra note 126. Furthermore, the operation of the statutes demonstrates the absence
of any invidious purpose. With the exception of the Puerto Rican statute, see P.R. Laws
Ann. fit. 29, § 467 (1985), none of the statutes require that an employee utilize this bene-
fit, but rather provide it as an option to be used to the extent deemed necessary by an
individual employee. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't. Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 46a-60(a)(7) (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-310 (1985). Thus, unlike the
mandatory maternity leave requirement struck down in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), the statutes do not penalize or burden pregnant women in any
fashion because of their preganancy. See id at 651; see also Turner v. Department of
Employment See., 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (per curiam) (blanket disqualification of women
from unemployment benefits for a period extending over an eighteen week period before
and after childbirth held unconstitutional). On the other hand, the statutes impose no
burden on men, because they do not deprive them of any employment benefit, nor do they
cover nonpregnant women disabled by other illnesses.
190. See Miller- Wohl I1, 692 P.2d at 1254. Furthermore, as the federal district court
noted, the statute achieves the sex-neutral goal of protecting the right to bear children
without sacrificing the income of one spouse. Miller- Wohi , 515 F. Supp. at 1266-67.
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cide whether to adopt a comprehensive leave entitlement for all work
disabilities. 191
In contrast to this constitutional analysis, the courts' statutory analysis
under Title VII has been notably less uniform. Essentially, the courts'
opinions reflect three rationales. First, it has been argued that the mater-
nity leave statutes present no conflict with an employer's responsibilities
under Title VII if leave benefits are simply extended to disabled males. 192
Title VII explicitly permits the states to legislate beyond the standards
imposed by federal law. 193 The only restriction on such legislation is that
it cannot impose obligations inconsistent with federal law. 194 An em-
ployer can avoid any inconsistent obligations, according to this reason-
ing, by extending leave benefits to all disabled employees. 195
Second, the lower courts have upheld the statutes on the ground that
they redress the disparate impact that no-leave or inadequate leave poli-
cies have on women. 196 Under disparate impact analysis, employment
policies fair in form but discriminatory in operation are unlawful unless
they can be justified by business necessity.1 97 Applying that analysis to
the maternity leave provisions, the courts have indicated that the absence
of an adequate leave policy could violate Title VII because of its dispro-
portionate impact on women. 98 While women would be affected by the
absence of a general disability leave policy to the same extent as men,
women would still bear the additional burden of pregnancy disability.' 99
Thus, if inadequate leave policies would violate Title VII, the courts con-
clude, then a statute guaranteeing pregnancy disability leave must be
191. See Miller- Woh 11, 692 P.2d at 1254.
192. See Miller- Wohl 1, 515 F. Supp. at 1267.
193. Section 708 of Title VII provides:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or
future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an
unlawful employment practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1982).
194. See id.
195. See Miller- Wohl 1, 515 F. Supp. at 1267. Although this suggests that the mater-
nity leave statutes would violate Title VII unless equal benefits were given to disabled
males, the court indicated that the absence of an adequate leave policy could violate Title
VII because of its disparate impact on women. See id. See supra notes 166-70.
196. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986); Miller- Woh1 , 692 P.2d at 1254.
The Montana Supreme Court indicated that it would be desirable if the legislature were
to extend leave benefits to disabled male employees in order to "end any argument that
the MMLA [Montana Maternity Leave Act] is indeed sex based discrimination." Miller-
Wohl I1, 692 P.2d at 1255.
197. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). See infra note 219.
198. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 395-96 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986); Miller Wohl I, 692 P.2d 1243, 1251-52, 1255
(Mont. 1984), appealfiled, 54 U.S.L.W. 3064-65 (U.S. Mar. 27, 1985) (84-1545).
199. Miller- Wohl 1, 692 P.2d at 1251.
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valid.2°°
Finally, one court has argued that the statutes are valid because they
do not constitute discrimination20' as Congress defined that term in the
PDA.2 °2 Congress enacted the PDA to overcome the Supreme Court's
opinion in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,203 where the Court held, track-
ing its analysis in Geduldig, that the exclusion of pregnancy from a pri-
vate employer's disability plan did not constitute unlawful sex
discrimination under Title VII.2°  The PDA provides that prohibited sex
discrimination under Title VII includes pregnancy discrimination, but
further states that pregnancy must always be treated the same as any
other disability for all employment-related purposes.2 5 Thus, the PDA
confirms that Title VII's fundamental guarantee of equal opportunity ex-
tends to pregnancy discrimination, while at the same time it seems to
require that pregnancy disability always be given equal treatment with
other work disabilities.20 6 In addition, the Supreme Court has recog-
200. See iL at 1254.
201. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 395 (9th Cir. 1985),
cerL granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
203. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
204. See icL at 138-39 ("[G]ender-based discrimination does not result simply because
an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than all inclusive. For all that appears, preg-
nancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure
to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits,
accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially even-handed inclusion
of risks.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
205. The PDA provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section
2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection
shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion,
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were car-
ried to term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an abor-
tion: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing
abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to
abortion;
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (emphasis in original).
206. Thus, to paraphrase Title VII, the PDA prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex, which includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, with respect to limitations
or classifications that would result in the deprivation of employment opportunities. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(k), 2000e-2(a) (1982). What is declared unlawful, therefore, is not
only policies and practices explicitly using pregnancy as a basis for employment deci-
sions, but also limitations or classifications denying employment opportunity because
they fal to take pregnancy into account. This suggests that pregnancy cannot be used as
justification to provide inferior terms and conditions of employment, see supra note 38,
but also that the operation of neutral policies cannot have the effect of denying equal
opportunity as the result of their treatment of pregnancy. See infra note 221.
The second clause of the PDA, however, states that pregnancy must always be treated
the "same" as any other disability for all employment-related purposes. See 42 U.S.C.
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nized that Congress prohibited the less favorable treatment of pregnancy
when compared with other disabilities.20 7 This has been interpreted by
one court to mean that Title VII does not prohibit more favorable treat-
ment of pregnancy if the result is to contribute to the statute's goal of
equal employment opportunity.20 8 The equal treatment required by the
PDA should be measured in terms of employment opportunity, not iden-
tity of benefits.209 Indeed, the court pointed out, by requiring the inclu-
sion of pregnancy benefits in employer disability policies, Congress
forced employers to spend more dollars on their female employees in or-
der to assure equal coverage of disability risks.210  Leave days can be
analogized to disability benefit dollars; they simply equalize the risk of
job loss from disability.2 1'
B. Critique of the Courts' Decisions
None of the lower courts' arguments provide a satisfactory rationale
for upholding the maternity leave statutes.212 The equal protection anal-
§ 2000e(k) (1982). If this clause is interpreted as a limitation on the first clause, then
pregnancy can never be taken into account in fashioning employment policies. It would
therefore impose a substantial limitation on the definition of discrimination by requiring
that all employment policies be "pregnancy-blind." See infra note 222. On the other
hand, if this clause is an amplification of the first clause, it merely reinforces the prohibi-
tion against disparate treatment on the basis of pregnancy by requiring that at a mini-
mum pregnant employees be treated the same as employees with other job disabilities.
This would not preclude, then, a prohibition against policies (or the lack thereof) that fail
to ensure that pregnancy does not operate to reduce equal employment opportunity. See
infra note 221.
207. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983);
accord California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Gurerra, 758 F.2d 390, 395-96 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
noted that the PDA did not require that states be blind to pregnancy; rather, it en-
couraged them to take pregnancy into account in fashioning policies to ensure equal em-
ployment opportunity. Id. The court pointed out that the PDA's inclusion of pregnancy
within the definition of sex discrimination did not alter the substantive protection of Title
VII, including its prohibition of policies with a disparate impact. See id. at 396.
Although recognizing a "tension between the PDA's first clause, which subjects preg-
nancy to the same types of discrimination analysis to which it subjects sex, and its second
clause, which appears to demand pregnancy-neutral policies at all times," the court de-
clined to resolve this tension against the state maternity leave statute. See id.
208. According to the court, the PDA "construct[s] a floor beneath which pregnancy
disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise." Califor-
nia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted,
106 S. Ct. 783 (1986).
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id. "We see no principled reason to distinguish pregnancy disability days.
from . . . pregnancy disability dollars." Id.
212. There are those who would argue that only the result matters-if it is good for
women, as women define what they want, then the rationale is ultimately unimportant.
See Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 387,
400 (1984) ("The choice between equal treatment and special treatment is meaningful-if
at all--only on a case-by-case basis."). From a practical perspective this may be true, but
to the extent the legal system may be a vehicle for social change, it is both desirable and
necessary to articulate the principles legitimizing equality goals. See Sherry, Selective
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ysis is premised on a definition of sex discrimination that is simply unper-
suasive and inadequate. It rests on the proposition that pregnancy
classifications are not sex-based classifications, which defies biological re-
ality and common sense. It is not my intention to restate the various
criticisms of Geduldig, which have been thoroughly presented by numer-
ous commentators.2 13 In my view, what is most fundamental in that cri-
tique, however, is that Geduldig proceeds from a recognition of
pregnancy as a sex-unique condition to the conclusion that because of
this uniqueness, there can be no comparative analysis of the treatment of
the sexes to determine the existence of discrimination. Therefore, ac-
cording to the Court, no discrimination exists. This tautological reason-
ing seems to rest on an inability to conceptualize discrimination on the
basis of sex differences.
2 14
More importantly, however, Geduldig is simply irrelevant to the analy-
sis of maternity leave statutes. Geduldig focused on the issue of whether
the exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise comprehensive disability
statute constituted unlawful sex discrimination.2 1 The issue raised by
the maternity leave statutes, however, is whether the affirmative guaran-
tee of a pregnancy-related benefit is permissible. In Geduldig, the Court
had to determine whether a state could exclude pregnancy; with the ma-
ternity leave statutes, the courts have to determine whether a state may
include only pregnancy. Thus, the Geduldig analysis is inappropriate for
determining whether the guarantee of an affirmative benefit based on the
goal of ensuring equal opportunity, such as that provided by the mater-
nity leave statutes, is permissible.2 1
6
Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruc-
tion, 73 Geo. LJ. 89, 98-102 (1984) (analysis of deconstructionists may demystify deci-
sion but provides no guidance to better results and is therefore fundamentally
inconsistent with the notion of a legal system).
213. As one commentator has noted, criticizing Geduldig "has since become a cottage
industry." Law H, supra note 74, at 983. For a list of the commentaries, see id. at 983
nn. 107-09.
214. It also reflects a failure to analyze the concept of equality embedded in the equal
protection clause. If the equal protection clause requires actual, meaningful equality be-
tween the sexes, then Geduldig provides no rationale for the exclusion of pregnancy from
an otherwise comprehensive structure of disability benefits.
215. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
216. The inapplicability of Geduldig to the issue raised by the maternity leave statutes
is similar to the critical distinction between the nature of the issues raised in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) and United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Santa Fe Trail, the Court held that Title VII's prohibi-
tion against race discrimination was intended to protect whites, as well as blacks and
other minorities, from race discrimination. See Santa Fe Trail, 427 U.S. at 287. When
the issue of whether affirmative action programs designed to benefit minorities which
disadvantaged whites violated Title VII was raised in Weber, Santa Fe Trail appeared to
dictate that such programs be declared unlawful. To the contrary, however, the Court
recognized that the legal issue was simply not the same. Whether whites are included
within the persons protected by the statute does not answer the question whether affirma-
tive policies designed to correct historic discrimination constitute prohibited
discrimination.
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The courts' Title VII analysis is even more troubling, because there is
no precedent under Title VII like Geduldig permitting avoidance of the
sex differences issue. Rather, the necessity of defining sex discrimination,
and deciding whether it should take into account real differences between
the sexes, is dictated by the structure of Title VII discrimination the-
ory.2 17 Under traditional Title VII theory, the validity of the maternity
217. The resolution of the issue of how sex discrimination is defined under Title VII
may also determine whether the state statutes are preempted by ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983). The existence of any preemption issue depends on
whether unpaid maternity leave, reinstatement and protection of job status are employee
benefits governed by ERISA. ERISA regulates, inter alia, "employee welfare benefit
plans," including plans, funds, or programs that provide disability benefits. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1) (1982). The term "benefit" is not expressly defined in the statute. See id.
§ 1002. When read in conjunction with the interpretative regulations accompanying the
statute, however, what is meant is some monetary benefit, because the regulations define
"benefits" as those listed under the statutory definition or included within § 302 of the
Labor Management Reporting Act of 1947, all of which are monetary benefits. See 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(2) (1985); see also Hibernia Bank v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 411 F. Supp. 478, 489 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("The benefits to which a beneficiary must
be entitled are, in general, 'fringe benefits' such as medical disability and vacation pay-
ments."). If ERISA only governs monetary employee benefits, then it would not cover
unpaid maternity leave.
Furthermore, the regulations also indicate that many payroll practices are exempt
from ERISA. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(b) (1985). This includes payment of an em-
ployee's normal compensation out of the employer's general assets due to disability, see
id. § 2510.3-1(b)(2), or non-disability leave, see id. § 2510.3-1(b)(3)(i)-(v). See, e.g., Cali-
fornia Hosp. Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d 856, 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding payroll
practices exemption). Thus even if unpaid leave could in some fashion be construed as a
payroll practice, it would be exempt under ERISA. Moreover, if an employer provided
paid leave, it would be exempt if payment was made out of general assets.
Nevertheless, if the benefits provided under the maternity leave statutes were construed
to fall within the scope of ERISA, they would not be preempted if either they fall within
the category of state disability insurance laws, which are exempted from ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1982); or they are consistent with federal law-in this case Title
VII-that is unaffected by ERISA. Id. § 1144(d).
The key to whether the statutes would satisfy either of these exceptions is the Supreme
Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983). According to Shaw, the
disability insurance exemption is to be narrowly construed to save from preemption only
those state laws requiring the establishment of a separately administered disability plan.
See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 107. It therefore does not save particular benefits in plans other-
wise subject to ERISA. Id. Whether the maternity leave statutes fit within this exemp-
tion depends on whether they are held to require the establishment of a separately
administered disability plan. In other words, while the statutes clearly confer disability
benefits on the basis of actual disability due to pregnancy, it is uncertain whether they
require the requisite qualities of "separateness" or the establishment of a "plan." None of
the statutes include a requirement that the leave provisions be administered separately
from any other leave programs offered by the employer. Furthermore, the statutes do not
require that the employer establish any particular structure or policy on maternity leave,
raising the issue of whether the statutes establish any disability "plan." See id. Finally,
the exemption may be construed to include only disability plans conferring monetary
benefits rather than unpaid time and reinstatement rights, because of the statutory refer-
ence to disability insurance laws. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3) (1982).
If the statutes fail to fit within the disability exemption, then they can survive preemp-
tion only if they are consistent with the enforcement of federal law. As the Court pointed
out in Shaw, Title VII expressly preserves state discrimination laws as long as they do not
conflict with Title VII. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 101 (citing § 708 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
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leave provisions depends on whether the statutes require disparate treat-
ment ' 8 or have a disparate impact 2 9 on the basis of sex by mandating
employment policies that solely benefit women." ° If pregnancy is
viewed as a disability unique to women, then men and women are not
similarly situated with respect to the risks and employment disadvan-
tages of work disabilities. Once this difference is recognized, conferring
pregnancy benefits does not constitute disparate treatment because no
discrimination is suffered by either sex. Similarly, such a policy ad-
versely affects no one because of his or her sex; employees of both sexes
are treated the same for all other disability purposes.
On the other hand, if real differences between the sexes cannot be
taken into account, that is, if pregnancy disability must always be treated
the same as other disabilities, then male and female employees would be
§ 2000e-7 (1982)). The state law at issue in Shaw conflicted with Title VII by prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy at a time when Title VII permitted such dis-
crimination. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88-89. The Court held that, under these circum-
stances, ERISA preempted state law. See iL 103-06.
Under the rationale of Shaw, the maternity leave statutes would not be preempted if
they simply mandate what Title VII requires. If the prohibition against sex discrimina-
tion in Title VII prohibits employers from failing to provide a reasonable period of mater-
nity leave and reinstatement rights, then the state statutes only parallel that prohibiton
and make it explicit. They are thus not preempted by ERISA. What Shaw does not
make altogether clear is whether a state statute that does not conflict with Title VII but
mandates more than required by that law, could survive ERISA preemption. In other
words, if the benefits protected under the maternity leave statutes are permissible under
Title VII but not required by it, can the the state provisions survive ERISA preemption?
Language in Shaw suggests a negative answer, although the question was not before the
Court in that case. The Court characterized Title VII as "neutral" on all employment
practices not prohibited by it, and found that the only federal interest in state law was
simply to save it from preemption. See id. at 103 & n.24.
If the issue of ERISA preemption is reached, therefore, the resolution of that issue is
dependent on how sex discrimination is defined under Title VII. If the statutes are
deemed in conflict with that definition, then they clearly are preempted by ERISA. See
29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1982). If, on the other hand, the definition of discrimination man-
dates the benefits guaranteed by the maternity leave statutes, then the statutes are not
preempted. See id If Title VII does not require such benefits, but permits the states to
go beyond its terms and require these benefits, it is uncertain whether the statutes would
fall under the preemption provisions of ERISA.
218. Under disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must demonstrate, by direct or
circumstantial evidence, that the employer's conduct resulting in adverse employment
consequences for the plaintiff, was motivated by impermissible considerations of race, sex,
national origin or religion. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252-60 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
219. Under disparate impact analysis, an employment policy that has a disproportion-
ate impact on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin and that cannot be justified
on the grounds of business necessity constitutes prohibited discrimination. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
220. It should also be pointed out that the statutes arguably disadvantage non-preg-
nant disabled female employees. Whether this makes a difference depends on how you
frame the discrimination issue. If the issue is coverage for disability risks, then non-
pregnant women are disadvantaged to the same extent as are men. On the other hand, if
the issue is availability of benefits, women as a class are given greater protection by the
coverage of one sex-specific disability, while men as a class are given no benefits or protec-
tion for any sex-specific disability.
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similarly situated with respect to disability. Under either disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact analysis, the preferential treatment of sex-
linked disability would constitute unlawful discrimination.22'
Under Title VII analysis, therefore, the question of the treatment of
sex differences cannot be avoided.2 Yet this is precisely what the courts
have done. Suggesting that the validity of the statutes can be resolved by
the voluntary extension of leave benefits to all employees ducks the cen-
tral question of whether the statutes are unlawful. This analysis implies
that a conflict exists between the state statutes and Title VII. If a conflict
221. See, e.g., Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (inadequate leave has disparate impact on women); In re Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. Maternity Benefits Litig., 602 F.2d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 1979) (neutral policy of failing
to guarantee reinstatement from leaves of absence, including pregnancy leave, deprives
female employees of employment opportunities); Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 599 F.2d
582, 586-87 (4th Cir.) (neutral policy of refusing to renew contract if employee cannot
commit to uninterrupted year of service burdens females who must report foreseeable
disabilities), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 965 (1979); Zichy v. City of Philadelphia, 590 F.2d
503, 507-08 (3d Cir. 1979) (claim that maternity policy limiting leave time and resulting
in loss of seniority and benefits had disparate impact compared to other sick leaves);
Eberts v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 581 F.2d 357, 358-61 (3d Cir. 1978) (cause of action
exists under Title VII where seniority and reinstatement policies regarding maternity
leave impose substantial burdens on women); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 526 F. Supp.
1035, 1038, 1040 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (maternity leave policies, including required notice
of pregnancy, reinstatement limitations, and length of service requirements, constituted
disparate treatment and had disparate impact), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 1200
(6th Cir. 1983); Communication Workers of Am. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 509 F. Supp. 6,
10 (N.D. Il. 1980) (seniority and reinstatement policies concerning maternity leave bur-
den employment opportunities).
222. In other words, if benefits are granted for pregnancy, then they must be given to
all other comparable work disabilities. Some courts have upheld such a "pregnancy
blind" approach. See, e.g., Langley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 644 F.2d 1124, 1129
(5th Cir. 1981) (requiring employer to permit employee to use sick leave or vacation leave
to extend maternity leave would allow award of greater economic benefit to women, a
result not mandated by Title VII); Eblin v. Whirlpool Corp., 36 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1632, 1635 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (absenteeism policy counting pregnancy absences
the same as other disability absences does not violate Title VII); EEOC v. Southwestern
Elec. Power Co., 591 F. Supp. 1128, 1130-31, 1135 (W.D. Ark. 1984) (maternity leave
policy treating pregnancy the same as other disabilities not discriminatory, despite discre-
tion given to managers to extend leave and to disregard employee's physician's recom-
mendation for additional leave); Mason v. Continental Ins. Co., 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 578, 581 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (discharge of employee for taking leave beyond maxi-
mum permitted by employer is not discriminatory; employer not required to treat preg-
nancy more favorably than other disabilities).
It appears that the argument against the maternity leave statute rests on disparate
treatment analysis, whereas the defense of the statutes is justified by disparate impact
analysis. On the one hand, this suggests that these two theories of discrimination may be
in fundamental conflict. On the other hand, the conflict is ultimately based on how one
defines sex discrimination. In other words, a consistent definition of sex discrimination
removes the conflict. If the definition of sex discrimination requires a sex-blind or equal
treatment approach, then the maternity leave statutes fail under either the disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact analysis. If the definition of sex discrimination takes account of
sex differences, and prohibits policies that disadvantage one sex based on such differences,
while requiring equalization of differences where they affect employment opportunity,
then the maternity leave statutes could be upheld under either disparate treatment or
disparate impact analysis.
MATERNITY LEAVE
exists, employers cannot be required to resolve it; rather, employers are
simply not bound by the conflicting state obligation.' m Similarly, the
argument that the statutes are valid because the absence of a leave policy
would have a disparate impact on women 4 fails to address the question
of whether an affirmative statutory requirement is a permissible means to
remedy an arguable violation of Title V1125 The analysis of employer
leave policies is simply not dispositive of the legal issue raised by the state
statutes. The conclusion that Title VII requires employers to provide
adequate leave does not answer the question of whether the state can
impose such a requirement by gender-specific legislation.
Alternatively, the attempt to read the PDA as permitting greater bene-
fits for pregnancy than for other disabilities rests on an unconvincing
attempt to harmonize a perceived conflict between the concepts of equal
treatment and equal opportunity in the language of the PDA. The reso-
lution of this conflict is premised on the conclusion that since the effect of
the PDA was to require employers to pay more to cover female employ-
ees in order to provide disability coverage equivalent to that of men, the
statute permits favorable treatment of pregnancy as long as it is designed
to advance the goal of equal employment opportunity. This argument
fails to recognize the distinction between requiring inclusion of preg-
nancy within an existing benefit structure and requiring the establish-
ment of a benefit structure that only includes pregnancy. Moreover, it
suggests no clear limit on the conferral of pregnancy benefits. Even if
there is no ceiling imposed by the PDA on pregnancy benefits, the statute
nevertheless establishes some parameters on the type of benefit structure
223. This was the conclusion reached by the vast majority of courts when the women's
protective labor statutes, see infra note 252, were challenged under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20, 21, 23 (9th Cir. 1974)
(invalidating under Title VII California law providing premium overtime pay for wo-
men), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219,
1225-27 (9th Cir. 1971) (invalidating under Title VII employer policy required by Cali-
fornia law limiting length of female workday and kinds of work); Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1969) (invalidating under Title VII
employer policy restricting weights women could lift). But see Hays v. Potlatch Forests,
Inc., 465 F.2d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding Arkansas law mandating employers
to pay female workers time-and-a-half for overtime work, daily overtime could be paid to
both male and female employees). For an argument in favor of extending benefits to men
in order to save an otherwise invalid statute, see L. Kanowitz, supra note 79, at 50.
224. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
225. The Court's decisions regarding affirmative action, see United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206-08 (1979) (upholding affirmative action plan designed to com-
pensate for past racial discrimination), are not dispositive, because the purpose of the
maternity leave statutes is not to compensate for past, historical pregnancy discrimina-
tion, but rather to deal with present and continuing burdens imposed by the existing
workplace structure. See supra note 216. The analysis may be similar, however, in that
in both instances the fundamental issue raised is the concept of equality. See generally R.
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 227, 239 (1976) (arguing that the right to equality
under the equal protection clause encompasses a right to equal treatment and a right to
treatment as an equal, and that the constitutionality of a preferred admissions policy on
the basis of race "is justified if it serves a proper policy that respects the right of all
members of the community to be treated as equals.").
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that can be required of employers.22 6
Furthermore, the above analysis rests almost exclusively on the facial
language of the statute, without close consideration of the underlying leg-
islative history. The legislative history of the PDA227 does not support a
clear resolution of this tension in the statutory language. 228 Rather, it
reflects the same dichotomy between the recognition of pregnancy as a
unique condition that historically and currently has operated to severely
limit women's employment opportunities, while at the same time endeav-
oring to treat pregnancy no differently from any other work disability.2 29
The "same treatment" concern 230 expressed so strongly throughout
the legislative history is clearly the result of the peculiar circumstances
under which the PDA was enacted. A major concern of Congress in
enacting the PDA was to reverse the specific result in Gilbert2 3 1 in order
to require the inclusion of pregnancy in disability and health insurance
226. For instance, the state could not require employers to impose a mandatory leave
requirement. See supra note 44.
227. H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong, & Ad. News 4749, 4749-65; S. Rep. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-17 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; 124 Cong. Rec. 21,434-21,443 (1978) (House de-
bate); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,384-29,389 (1977) (Senate debate).
228. See infra note 235-44 and accompanying text. Commentators have analyzed the
contradictory language of the statute. See, e.g., Comment, Sexual Equality Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 690, 707, 721 (1983) (the PDA sup-
ports a "pluralist" model of equality, one that recognizes and compensates for the differ-
ences between the sexes, over an assimilationist "sex-blind" approach); Note,
Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L.J. 929,
934-35 (1985) (the PDA incorporates disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis;
thus it is not limited to a "parity" standard). For an analysis of the difficulties of divining
congressional intent, see R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 314-31 (1985).
229. In introducing the bill during the Senate debates, Senator Williams, one of the
sponsors of the bill stated:
[M]ost policies and practices of discrimination against women in the
workforce result from attitudes about pregnancy and the role of women who
become pregnant....
Because of their capacity to become pregnant, women have been viewed as
marginal workers not deserving the full benefits of compensation and advance-
ment granted to other workers....
The central purpose of the bill is to require that women workers be treated
equally with other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
The key to compliance in every case will be equality of treatment.
123 Cong. Rec. 29,385 (1977).
230. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4749, 4751 ("[The bill] specifically defines standards which require that
pregnant workers be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or
inability to work."); id. at 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4752
("The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other em-
ployees on the basis of their ability or inability to work."); see also id. at 5, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4753 ("this bill would require that women
disabled due to pregnancy, childbirth or other related medical conditions be provided the
same [medical] benefits as those provided other disabled workers"); Senate Report, supra
note 227, at 4-5 (same).
231. See supra notes 203-04, infra notes 287-99 and accompanying text.
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policies.232 Thus, not surprisingly, both the House and Senate reports
emphasize that the statute will guarantee the "same" or "equal" treat-
ment of pregnancy as other disabilities by requiring that pregnancy be
included within the covered risks of a disability plan.233 To the extent
that Congress considered other terms and conditions of employment, in-
cluding leave, it is also clear that the purpose of the statute was to put
pregnancy on the same footing as other work disabilities.'
There are indications in the legislative history, however, that the re-
quirement of "same" treatment does not mean that employers are not to
take pregnancy into account in fashioning their policies, nor are they
prohibited from providing additional benefits for pregnancy to ensure
equal employment opportunity. 23 5 First, Congress clearly did not intend
to create a special definition of pregnancy discrimination as a subspecies
of sex discrimination. 236 Thus, the substantive law of Title VII, includ-
ing both disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses, applies to
sex discrimination claims involving pregnancy.237 Second, the legislative
history clearly reflects the uniqueness of pregnancy as it impacts on equal
employment opportunities for women. Congress was aware that the em-
ployment structure imposes additional burdens exclusively on women
solely because of pregnancy. 238 This suggests that Congress did not in-
232. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4749-53; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 2-5. The over-
whelming concern with coverage of pregnancy in disability plans is also apparent from
the testimony presented at the hearings on the bill, which focused almost exclusively on
the importance of such benefits to women workers and their cost to employers. House
Hearings Part I, supra note 24, at 174-261; House Hearings Part II, supra note 24, at 3-71;
Senate Hearings, supra note 22 at 7-8.
233. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4752-53; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 4-5.
234. See H.R. Rep No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4749, 4754; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 6.
235. See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
236. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4749, 4753 ("Pregnancy-based distinctions will be subject to the same scru-
tiny on the same terms as other acts of sex discrimination proscribed in the existing
statute."); Senate Report, supra note 227, at 3-4 ("the bill defines sex discrimination, as
proscribed in the existing statute, to include ... physiological occurrences peculiar to
women; it does not change the application of Title VII to sex discrimination in any other
way").
237. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4749-51. Although Congress expected that in most cases the
use of a pregnancy classification would be per se discriminatory as disparate treatment, it
is clear that disparate impact analysis was not foreclosed. See id. at 3, reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4751; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 3-4.
238. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4749, 4751 ("the assumption that women will become pregannt[sic] and
leave the labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of
the discriminatory practices which keep women in low-paying and dead-end jobs"); see
also id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4754-55 ("[u]ntil a
woman passes the child-bearing age, she is viewed by employers as potentially preg-
nant"); Senate Report, supra note 227, at 3 (same); 124 Cong. Rec. 21,435 (1977) (re-
marks of Rep. Hawkins) ("Because many of the disadvantages imposed on women are
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tend to prohibit pregnancy-conscious policies designed to ensure equal
employment opportunity. 2
39
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the issue of whether states
could affirmatively require pregnancy-related benefits was simply not dis-
cussed during enactment of the PDA because the thrust of the legislation
focused mainly on the disability insurance exclusion issue.240 Congress'
predicated upon their capacity to become pregnant, genuine equality in the American
labor force is no more than an illusion.. . ."); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,388 (1977) (remarks of
Sen. Kennedy) ("Many... fringe benefit plans follow a discriminatory pattern of provid-
ing for types of... nonessential surgery such as vasectomies, but not pregnancies"); id. at
29,387 (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("Where other employees who face temporary periods of
disability do not have to face the same loss, it is especially important that we not ask a
potential mother to undergo severe disadvantages in order to bring another life into the
world."); id. at 29,385 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("Because of their capacity to become
pregnant, women have been viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full benefits of
compensation and advancement granted to other workers.").
239. See Senate Report, supra note 227, at 3. Most notably, Congress included in the
PDA the provision the § 703(h) of Title VII, the Bennett Amendment, would not be
applicable to limit the effect of the PDA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982). See supra note
205.
The Bennett Amendment provides that if a practice is authorized by the Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982), that is, if it is within one of the four enumerated excep-
tions to the Equal Pay Act, it is not unlawful under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1982). The provision in the PDA made it clear that cost-based equality of benefits was
not what Congress intended to require under the PDA. See Senate Report, supra note
227, at 7.
Another indication that Congress did not intend "same" treatment to mean identity of
benefits is the language in the committee reports and in the floor debates to the effect that
the PDA was designed to guarantee equal treatment as well as to ensure equal employ-
ment opportunity. See Senate Report, supra note 27, at 4 (same); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,387
(1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("The bill requires equal treatment when disability due to
pregnancy is compared to other disabling conditions.... It definitely does not require a
particular fringe benefit program. . . ."); id. at 29,645 (remarks of Sen. Stafford) ("The
touchstone of compliance with S. 995 is equality of treatment. . . "); H.R. Rep. No. 948,
95 Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4753 ("This
bill would prevent employers from treating pregnancy, childbirth and related medical
conditions in a manner different from their treatment of other disabilities.").
240. It is clear from the legislative history that Congress was well aware of state legis-
lation concerning pregnancy discrimination. Although no specific mention is made of
state maternity leave statutes, both committee reports refer to state statutes specifically
proscribing pregnancy discrimination and state court decisions construing state fair em-
ployment laws as including pregnancy within the definition of sex discrimination. See
H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4749, 4758-59; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 3, 10.
The congressional committees were also aware of state disability statutes covering
pregnancy. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95 Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4759; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 11; House Hearing Part
I, supra note 24, at 202-03 (statement of Ruth Weyland, Associate Gen. Counsel, Int'l
Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers). Congress' interest in the state disabil-
ity statutes was partially based on the information the state statutes could provide on the
question of the cost of including pregnancy within temporary disability coverage. In ad-
dition, in the Senate debate on the PDA, the issue was raised whether these state statutes
would be discriminatory under the PDA if they imposed a limitation on the period dur-
ing which pregnancy benefits would be paid. See 123 Cong. Rec. 29,643 (1977). At the
time the PDA was being considered, only Hawaii imposed no special limitations on the
payment of disability benefits because of pregnancy; the other four states with disability
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reaffirmance that the substantive definition of sex discrimination applies
to pregnancy discrimination and its recognition of the unique nature of
pregnancy discrimination weigh in favor of permitting affirmative state
statutes imposed time limits or maximum benefit levels. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4759. See supra
note 116 and accompanying text. The Senate colloquy concerning this issue focused on
the New Jersey statute, which at the time limited benefits for pregnancy disability to four
weeks before and four weeks after childbirth.
Mr. HATCH. Do the managers and sponsors of the bill intend S. 995 to be
preemptive of State laws so that no employer shall be required to take any ac-
tion with regard to any pregnancy related disability benefit, or to pay any such
benefit, which shall exceed the requirements of this act, by reason of any State
or local law or ordinace or by any regulation or order of any Federal, State or
local department or agency?
To put it in a somewhat different way, if a State law defines sex discrimina-
tion to include discrimination against pregnant women but the law contains a
cap on the length of disability benefits, would that State law supersede this law
so that it would be enforceable? ....
Mr. WILLIAMS. I suggest to the Senator from Utah that title VII does not
preempt State laws which would not require violating title VII. This is made
clear by existing law. Section 708 of title VII, as well as section 706(c), ex-
pressly provides that State laws which protect employees from discrimination
shall remain in effect unless they operate to permit or require discrimination.
The question of a State law which provides or permits a cap on periods of disa-
bility-is that the question being raised by the Senator from Utah?
Mr. HATCH. Yes. I use that as a specific example.
Mr. WILLIAMS. I would think that here, again, the title VII test would
apply and it would be a question if whether there was discrimination. Within
the State law, if all disabilities were classified in terms of time, I would say that
would meet the test of nondiscrimination. I would think if a State law did
select, and it were found through all the tests on discrimination that the classifi-
cation and selection were discriminatory, then the State law that discriminated
would not be permitted to stand on a test.
Mr. HATCH. If it is nondiscriminatory, it should take preemption over the
Federal law in this matter?
Mr. WILLIAMS. That would be my interpretation of the law as it is.
Whether the Supreme Court would agree, we never know. That situation has
been tested in law and that is the conclusion we draw.
Mr. HATCH. So far as our legislative history here is concerned, that is the
correct senatorial interpretation. What about conflicts between the State and
Federal law? Would the State law preempt the Federal laws except in the mat-
ter where the Supreme Court or the Federal law states there is discrimination?
Mr. WILLIAMS. If there were clear conflicts on this issue and the States
attempted to permit what this legislation in an amendment of the Civil Rights
Act would prohibit, obviously the Federal law would prevail ....
I would like to offer an example of a clear conflict. We define discrimination
in our terms in this amendment, pregnancy and related conditions being sex
discrimination. If the negative were included in a State law, that would be in
absolute conflict with the Federal law and Federal law would prevail.
Mr. HATCH. Again where we have known discrimination?
Mr. WILLIAMS. What I am stating is the most stark conflict where it was
positively set at the State level that this particular situtation, pregnancy, is not
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action.24 ' Nevertheless, the legislative history is replete with statements
that the PDA would not require employers to adopt particular policies or
practices, but merely mandates non-discriminatory treatment under ex-
isting policies.242 Such statements of congressional intent might seem to
present an obstacle to requiring employment policies that compensate for
the unique nature of pregnancy disability, and suggest that an employer
would not violate Title VII by maintaining no disability, sick leave or
health insurance policies. On the other hand, this may only mean that
employers may be required to provide unpaid maternity leave, while not
having to establish a comprehensive paid temporary disability plan that
includes pregnancy. This would be the logical consequence of express
congressional intent that the PDA is intended to proscribe policies,
which would include a no leave policy, that have an adverse impact on
women's employment opportunities.243
discrimination. In the same context, we say it is discrimination and we would
prevail at the Federal level.
Mr. HATCH. But where there is in effect, no discrimination, then the State
law would prevail?
Mr. WILLIAMS. That is correct.
Mr. HATCH. And it would preempt the Federal law?
Mr. WILLIAMS. In all of the tests of discrimination, there clearly is an
opportunity for the State to act.
123 Cong. Rec. 29,643 (1977).
Finally, apart from the disability benefits issue and the cost of such benefits, the other
key focus of the debate concerning passage of the PDA was the addition of an anti-
abortion amendment to the bill. See 124 Cong. Rec. 21,440-21,442 (1978) (House de-
bate); 123 Cong. Rec. 29,656-12,660 (1977) (Senate debate).
241. See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4752 ("[the bill] in no way requires the institution of any new
programs where none currently exist"); Senate Report, supra note 227, at 4 ("the bill does
not require employers to treat pregnant women in any particular manner with respect to
hiring, permitting them to continue working, providing sick leave furnishing medical and
hospital benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter"); 123 Cong. Rec.
29,388 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("This amendment does not require all employ-
ers to provide disability insurance plans; it merely requires that employers who have
disability plans for their employees treat pregnancy-related disabilities in the same fash-
ion that all other temporary disabilitites are treated with respect to benefits and leave
policies.").
This position was also expressed with respect to leave, seniority rights and reinstate-
ment, see H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4749, 4752; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 4.
243. See Senate Report, supra note 227, at 4-5. In both committee reports, in the
sections dealing with policies other than disability and health insurance, there is some
indication that Congress intended the PDA to proscribe policies with a disproportionate
impact on women:
Leaves and Other Policies
In addition to its impact upon fringe benefit programs, this legislation pros-
cribes various other employment policies which adversely affect pregnant wo-
men. For example, under this bill, employers will not longer be permitted to
force women who become pregnant to stop working regardless of their ability to
continue; employers will not be permitted to set arbitrary time limits within
which disabled women must return to work, or before which they may not re-
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At a minimum, the legislative history is ambiguous, even contradic-
tory, concerning the treatment of pregnancy and the definition of preg-
nancy discrimination. There is admittedly much in the legislative history
that supports a "pregnancy-blind" definition of discrimination. Never-
theless, it ultimately is of great significance that Congress signaled its
clear intention that the treatment of pregnancy was to be subsumed
under a general sex discrimination standard.2 " In essence, this indicates
deference to judicial construction of what constitutes sex discrimination
within the confines of the policy concerns that lie at the heart of Title
VII.
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND SEX DIFFERENCES
The fundamental inadequacy of the lower courts' analysis of the ma-
ternity leave statutes is their failure to determine whether the constitu-
tional or statutory definition of sex discrimination permits taking sex
differences into account to ensure sex equality. The issue is unavoidable,
however, and should be addressed by the Supreme Court in deciding the
validity of the California maternity leave statute. If the Court squarely
confronts this question there is ample authority for taking sex differences
into account under the Court's prior sex discrimination decisions.245
However, those decisions provide no definitive standard for determining
what sex differences may be considered, or what means or objectives may
permissibly incorporate sex differences.246 The Court's existing doctrine
turn to work, if no such limits exist for other disabled employees; they will have
to credit women with accumulated seniority after a pregnancy disability leave
on the same terms applicable to other persons absent from work for other disa-
bilities; and they will not be able to refuse to hire or promote women simply
because they are pregnant.
The proscription of such policies is perhaps the most important effect of this
bill. For, as the history of sex discrimination shows, such policies have long-
term effects upon the careers of women and account in large part for the fact
women remain today primarily in low-paying, dead-end jobs.
Senate Report, supra note 227, at 6; see also H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4754 ("Other employment policies
which adversely affect pregnant workers are also covered").
Both reports indicate that Congress did not intend to require institution of paid benefits
if an employer did not have a disability or sick leave policy. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4753; Senate
Report, supra note 227, at 4. Furthermore, if an employer had a disability plan, only
payment for actual disability due to pregnancy is required. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4753; Senate
Report, supra note 227, at 4. The reports do not, however, specifically address the issue
of unpaid leave, continuation of job seniority, or reinstatement rights, except in an ambig-
uous section noted above. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4749, 4753; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 4.
244. See supra text accompanying note 237.
245. See infra notes 247-57, 263-69, and 286-310.
246. See infra notes 258-61, 272-85, and 312-15. For criticism of the Court's differ-
ences approach, see supra notes 75, 81; L. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 238-45 (1985);
Freedman, supra note 7, at 943-61; Powers, The Shifting Parameters of Affirmative Ac-
tion: Pragmatic Paternalism in Sex-Based Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 Wayne
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nevertheless must be the starting point for analyzing the validity of the
maternity leave statutes.
A. Constitutional Analysis of Sex Differences
There is no question that the Court's constitutional opinions indicate
that gender differences may be taken into account to assess the validity of
sex-based legislative classifications. The Court has never held that the
equal protection clause requires legislation to be "sex-blind." '247 Rather,
the Court has indicated that legislation may be "sex-conscious," '248 but
has struggled to define both the sex differences that may be used as the
justification for sex-based classifications, 249 and the level of scrutiny to be
applied to these classifications.250
The Court's concept of differences has only slowly evolved from a defi-
nition based on paternalistic, culturally-based stereotypes.2 51 At the turn
of the century the Court upheld state women's protective labor laws 2
5 2
L. Rev. 1281, 1285-1301 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Powers II]; Scales, supra note 74, at
377-401; Taub & Schneider, supra note 38, at 125-35.
247. Cf Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 355-56 (1978) (opinion of Bren-
nan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.) (the Court has never adopted the
view that the Constitution is color-blind).
248. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76
(1971).
249. See infra notes 251-61 and accompanying text.
250. Although the Court appeared to be moving toward adoption of a strict scrutiny
standard for sex based classification, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S 677, 688
(1973) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.), it ultimately adopted a different test, see Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976). It is interesting to note that despite Justice Brennan's
statement in Frontiero that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected
to strict judicial scrutiny," Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.),
he authored the Court's opinion in Craig that adopted a less stringent, intermediate level
of scrutiny. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
251. See, eg., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concur-
ring) ("Man is, or should be, wonan's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belong to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.").
252. For a detailed account of the evolution of protective labor laws exclusively ap-
plied to women, see J. Baer, supra note 39. As Baer notes, these laws were originally
passed because women worked under worse working conditions than men. See id. at 15.
The remedy for this situation provided by these laws was to require employers to observe
minimun working conditions for women. Id. at 26. While this was intended to curb the
abuses of employers, it also prevented women from competing equally with men, who
were not subject to such limitations. Id. at 25-26. This was exacerbated by technological
and social changes that removed may of the abuses of the workplace while leaving intact
the limitations on the employment of women. See id. at 10-12.
The sexual stereotypes which underlay protective women's labor legislation were not,
of course, confined to that area of the law. For two excellent surveys of sex discrimina-
tion by law and judicial construction of these laws, see Cavanaugh, 'A Little Dearer Than
His Horse': Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
260 (1971) and Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1971).
For a description and list of these laws see B. Brown, A. Freedman, H. Katz & A.
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on the basis that women merited such special protection because of their
unique childbearing and child-rearing roles, and their "natural depen-
dency." '253 Thus, paternalistic notions about the effects of pregnancy and
patriarchal assumptions about the social role of mothers and the gener-
ally dependent nature of women were the basis for recognizing "real"
differences between the sexes.254
This concept of difference was used to justify sex-based legislation 25s
under an extremely deferential standard of review" 6 until the early
Price, Women's Rights and the Law: The Impact of the ERA on State Laws 208-19
(1977)
253. The landmark case was Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which the
Court upheld Oregon's statute prohibiting the employment of women for more than ten
hours per day in any mechanical establishment, factory or laundry. See id. at 416-17,
423. The statute was challenged by an employer who was prosecuted for violating the
statute, on the basis that this limitaion on women's hours violated the employer's freedom
of contract. See id. at 417.
The statute was defended by labor reform groups, led by the National Consumer's
League, who engaged Louis Brandeis to argue the case on behalf of the state of Oregon.
See J. Baer, supra note 39, at 57. Seeking to distinguish this case from Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S 45 (1905), where the Court had struck down a maximun hours law on
freedom of contract grounds, see id. at 53, Brandeis decided to defend the statute on the
basis that empirical data supported the conclusion that there are sexual differences thatjustify differential treatment of women. See J. Baer, supra note 39, at 57. This first
"Brandeis brief' therefore largely defended the statute based on this "factual" data rather
than legal precedent. Id. The data Brandeis presented was primarily anecdotal evidence
of factory conditions and their relationship to employees' health. Id. at 59. The data did
not support the conclusion that women were uniquely susceptible to the deleterious ef-
fects of long hours. Id. at 60. The Court's opinion largely ignored this justification for
the statute and instead focused on a two-part rationale for upholding the statute; first,
the physical differences between men and women, particularly women's "motherhood"
role, see Muller, 208 U.S. at 421, and second, women's natural dependency, which justi-
fied, indeed necessitated, legislative action to protect women, see id. at 412-22. The Court
remarked:
[T]here is that in [a woman's] disposition and habits of life which will operate
against a full assertion of [her] rights ....
Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a
class by herself, and .... she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look
to [men] for protection... [H]er physical structure and a proper discharge of
her maternal funcions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-
being of the race-justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the
passion of man.
Id. at 422.
254. See Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22. See generally Powers II, supra note 246, at 1290
("In developmental terms, women were perceived as being at some static point between
that status of child and adult, defined as maleness, and thus in need of a paternal
figure.").
255. See, e.g., Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S 385, 388-89, 396 (1915) (statute limiting
the number of hours a woman could work in a day and in a week); Miller v. Wilson, 236
U.S. 373, 379, 384 (1915) (same); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 678, 680 (1914)
(statute limiting the number of hours women could work in factories).
256. See Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 394-96 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236
U.S. 373, 380-81 (1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 678-80 (1914). Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), was an exception to the Court's general view in this period,
epitomized by Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 57 (1905), that economic regulation was
an impermissible limitation on freedom of contract. Compare Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-23
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1970's, when the Court began to reexamine its concept of sex differences
and rejected differences defined by cultural and social stereotypes.25 7 De-
spite this rejection of sex stereotypes as the basis for recognizing sex dif-
ferences, however, the Court continues to be bedeviled by its inability to
separate real and stereotypical sex differences. As one commentator has
noted, the Court has failed to separate average, often culturally-defined,
differences from definitional, physically-defined, differences.258 Of equal
significance is the fact that in Geduldig, the Court refused to recognize
pregnancy-the quintessential definitional difference between the sexes-
(state has right under police power to regulate working hours of women) with Lochner,
198 U.S. at 57 ("There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person
or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a
baker."). The Court's position changed, however, with its decision in West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the Court held that the right to freedom of con-
tract was subject to reasonable restraint, see id. at 391-93, and thereafter adopted a defer-
ential stance toward economic regulation. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
731-32 (1963) ("[We] refuse to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legisla-
tion.'. . . Whether the legislature takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer,
Lord Keynes or some other is no concern of ours.") (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)) (footnotes omitted); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 485-86 (1955) (upholding Oklahoma statute restricting the ability of opti-
cians to fit or duplicate eyeglasses); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1949) (upholding state "right-to-work" law). Although
there was no longer any need to utilize the sex differences rationale to uphold protective
legislation, this rationale nevertheless survived and was the fundamental test applied in
sex discrimination cases until the 1970's. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62
(1961) (upholding state statute allowing women to decline to serve on a jury because of a
woman's role as the center of the home and family life); Goesaert v. Cleary, 355 U.S. 464,
466 (1948) (upholding state statute preventing all women, except wives or daughters of
tavern owners, from selling liquor because of the potential moral and social problems that
could arise). See generally Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrini-
nation and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232, 238-42 (1965) (discussing the need to
discard certain assumptions about women in order to eliminate sex discrimination).
257. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278, 283 (1979) (statute imposing alimony
obligations only on husbands found unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192,
204 (1976) (statute prohibiting sale of low alcohol beer to males under the age of 21 and
to females under the age of 18 discriminates against males 18-20 years old); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) (statute establishing an older age for majority for males
than females in the context of support obligations found unconstitutional); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38, 653 (1975) (statute providing benefits to widow and
minor children based on deceased husband's earnings while conferring benefits only on
minor children and not widower based on deceased wife's earnings found to reinforce
traditional stereotypes); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (statute re-
quiring servicewoman to show husband actually dependent on her for over half of his
support as prerequisite to claim him as a dependent, while serviceman permitted auto-
matically to claim his wife as dependent found discriminatory against women); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 73, 76 (1971) (finding unconstitutional statute giving preference to
men over women when man and woman similarly situated apply to serve as administra-
tor of estate).
258. Freedman, supra note 7, at 922-28; see also Powers II, supra note 246, at 1290-
1308 (the Court has rejected romantic paternalism, but appears to have adopted "prag-
matic" paternalism in its stead). For a critique of Freedman's analysis of the Court's
decisions, see Maltz, Sex Discrimination in the Supreme Court-A Comment on Sex
Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 1985 Duke L.J. 177.
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as a sex difference.2 9 Thus, for example, the Court might view the
greater childcare responsibilities of women, which can be statistically es-
tablished as an "average" characteristic,26" as a "real" difference between
the sexes, while not viewing women's unique physical ability to bear chil-
dren as a sex difference. Apart from this illogical approach to pregnancy,
the Court's difficulty in defining the nature of sex differences may be re-
lated to what at best can be charitably seen as a subconscious incorpora-
tion of prevailing social stereotypes within an unclear definition of sex
differences. In addition, the Court's approach highlights an underlying
question of when, if ever, sexual roles dictated by social stereotypes may
legitimately be the basis of sex-based classification.26
Although this latter question has been considered by the Court in its
examination of what are legitimate legislative goals and legitimate means
to achieve those goals where legislation is based on sex classifications,2 62
the issue has not been addressed in the context of what constitutes real
sex differences. Under the Court's current test of "heightened scrutiny"
applied in sex discrimination cases, "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. '2 63 The Court has sanctioned benign
discrimination under this test by recognizing as an important govern-
ment objective the "reduction of the disparity in economic condition be-
tween men and women caused by the long history of discrimination
against women." 2" The Court has simultaneously attempted to distin-
guish this legitimate compensatory objective from classifications based on
259. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974). For a discussion of
Geduldig, see supra notes 183-87, 213-14 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982)
(statutory objectives may not be based on the assumption that one gender "suffer[s] from
an inherent handicap or [is] innately inferior."); Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super.
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) ("We need not be medical doctors to discern that young
men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the
risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer dispro-
portionately the profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual
activity."). As one commentator has noted, paternalism dies hard, and the Court contin-
ues to accept stereotypical notions about women as a class. See Powers II, supra note
246, at 1290-93, 1307-08.
262. See infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text.
263. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
264. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (citing Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)). The Court has
repeatedly upheld higher benefits for women-not merely a different standard for entitle-
ment to the benefit-because the benefits compensated for historical discrimination. See,
e.g., Webster, 430 U.S. at 314-16, 317 (exclusion of three lowest income years from calcu-
lation of base period for social security benefits); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498,
499-500, 508-09 (1975) (four more years allowed before "up or out" of military, based on
limited career opportunities for women in military); Kahn, 416 U.S. at 352-54 (S500
property tax exemption for widows allowed based on historic economic discrimination
against women); cf. Regents of the Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (1978) (opinion of
Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.) (government may consider
race in efforts to remedy historic racial discrimination).
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archaic and overbroad sex stereotypes that operate to perpetuate sex
discrimination. 1 6
5
Thus, the Court has required that the objective served by such classifi-
cations must be achieved by means substantially related to the objec-
tive.266 A gender classification favoring one sex is permissible only "if it
intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is dispropor-
tionately burdened. '2 67 Sex classifications may not be used as an inaccu-
rate, stereotype-laden proxy for some other characteristic, for example,
dependency, to achieve a valid objective.268 In other words, the effect of
the statute must not create a new "cage" in the guise of compensation. 69
This analysis recognizes that cultural and sexual stereotypes have been
the basis for historical discrimination that merits affirmative relief or "be-
nign" discrimination to counterbalance the present impact of that dis-
crimination.2 11 It nevertheless requires that that objective be realized
without perpetuating old stereotypes or creating new ones.27 I This effort
to take account of the deleterious consequences of sex stereotypes with-
out approving stereotyped responses to those consequences has suffered,
as has the Court's approach to the definition of sex differences, from il-
logical and inconsistent application. 72 In part, this application has been
265. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (single-
sex nursing school perpetuates stereotype of nursing as an exclusively female occupation);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (uncon-
stitutional for Social Security Act to provide female worker's spouse with less protection
than male worker's spouse); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975) (different majority
age for males than females used to determine when support payments will cease); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (Constitution forbids gender-based gener-
alization that female workers contribute less to family support).
266. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
267. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982).
268. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 143-46, 150-51 (1980)
(death benefits statute requiring that widowers, but not widows, prove actual dependency
on the deceased spouse's earnings had important objective of providing for needy spouses
but made invalid generalized assumption that women were financially dependent); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-80 (1979) (despite valid objectives of providing for needy spouses
and remedying historic discrimination against women, statute imposing alimony obliga-
tions exclusively on men had unjustifiable effect of reinforcing stereotype of women as
dependent).
269. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion of Bren-
nan, J.) ("There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude
of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in
a cage.") (footnote omitted).
270. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
272. For example, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 499-500, 508-10 (1975) and
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) the Court upheld, respectively, a preferential
promotion procedure for women in the military and the male-only draft registration law.
In effect, the Court tacitly approved the different roles played by men and women in the
military based on the assumption that these roles, especially the non-combat role of wo-
men, reflect a real difference between the sexes, rather than a social stereotype that only
men should engage in combat. See generally L. Kanowitz, supra note 79, at 26-28 (argu-
ing that Court decisions on sex discrimination reflect belief that sex differences, like racial
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due to deferential consideration of legislative objectives and means,?13
although the Court has shown signs of requiring more explicit proof that
the objective of challenged legislation is indeed to remedy historical sex
discrimination,274 and that the means chosen are closely tailored to that
end.
275
The Court's approach nevertheless seems to reflect a difficulty in mov-
ing from the condemnation of historical sex roles to a recognition of the
continuing pervasiveness and invidiousness of sex stereotyping.276 Be-
nign discrimination, which permits taking into account sex role differ-
ences based on the social and legal manifestations of sex stereotypes,277 is
justifiable only as a means to correct thepresent consequences of historical
discrimination.27 The goal of such legislative classifications is to equal-
ize a historical burden,2 79 which assumes that this compensatory remedy
will eventually be unnecessary with the abolition of the causes of histori-
cal discrimination. The Court, however, has also used this analysis to
justify efforts to counteract the continuing effect of current discrimination
based on existing cultural and social stereotypes of appropriate sex
roles.280 This extension of the circumstances under which sex roles can
be taken into account rests on the acceptance of these culturally and so-
cially determined roles as "real" differences. 281 However, the failure to
limit the circumstances under which sex roles can be taken into account
inhibits the development of a reasoned analysis to distinguish between
impermissible classifications based on sex stereotyping and permissible
classifications based on sex differences.
Not surprisingly, some of the same problems with the analysis of sex
differences permeate the Court's Title VII sex discrimination analysis.
While the Court has condemned employment policies based on "[m]yths
and purely habitual assumptions,1 2 2 or upon average differences be-
classifications are based on immutable characteristics); Freedman, supra note 7, at 954
(discussing that even Justice Marshall's dissent in Rostker "did not question the validity
of excluding women from combat, nor refer to Congress' assumptions about male and
female roles" (footnotes omitted); Powers II, supra note 246, at 1290 ("The paternalistic
themes concerning women's lack of strength. . . are no longer acceptable as articulated
rationale[s] in court opinions.") (emphasis in original).
273. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 72-83 (1981); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 509 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974).
274. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 215-17 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
275. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979).
276. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. See Powers II, supra note 246, at
1290-1307 (arguing that the Court has replaced its "romantic paternalism" approach
with a "pragmatic paternalism" approach). For the seminal article on sex stereotypes,
see Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. Rev. 345 (1980).
277. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 266-67 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 272.
281. See supra note 272.
282. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
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tween the sexes that are invalid in individual cases, 28 3 the Court has ap-
peared to accept women's sexuality as a sex difference.284 Furthermore,
the Court has hinted that women's heavier childcare responsibilities as
compared to men could be viewed as a "real" sex difference, thereby ig-
noring the societal discrimination which is the basis for this "fact."2 5
At the same time, the Court appears to have adopted a more finely
tuned view of sex differences under Title VII than under constitutional
analysis. The Court's cases concerning pregnancy discrimination clearly
adopt the view that pregnancy is a difference that must be considered in
discrimination analysis.286 The dissenting opinions in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert,2 7 which were expressly adopted by Congress in enacting
the PDA28 and embraced by the Court in Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,28 9 indicate that under either disparate treatment
or disparate impact analysis the sex-specific nature of pregnancy is the
basis for discrimination analysis.29°
Focusing on disparate treatment analysis, Justice Stevens remarked in
his Gilbert dissent that it is the capacity to become pregnant that primar-
ily distinguishes women from men.29 ' Because women and men are sim-
ply not similarly situated with respect to pregnancy, the proper focus of
analysis is the treatment of this sex-specific condition.292 Employment
policies specifically directed toward pregnancy by their nature discrimi-
283. See id. at 716.
284. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977).
285. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam)
("[t]he existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to
job performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction
under § 701(e) of the [Civil Rights Act of 1964]. But that is a matter of evidence tending
to show that the condition in question 'is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.' ").
286. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
670-72, 683-85 (1983) (employer hospitalization plan that covered employees and spouses
equally, but provided less extensive pregnancy benefits for spouses of male employees
held to violate Title VII); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140-42 (1977) (em-
ployer policy that allows employee forced to take sick leave for any reason other than
pregnancy to retain accumulated seniority held to violate Title VII); see also General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 159 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A realistic un-
derstanding of conditions found in today's labor environment warrants taking pregnancy
into account in fashioning disability policies."); id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[T]he rule at issue places the risk of absence caused by pregnancy in a class by itself.
By definition, such a rule discriminates on account of sex; for it is the capacity to become
pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male,") (footnote omitted).
287. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 146 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
288. See H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4749, 4749-50; Senate Report, supra note 227, at 6.
289. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 677-79
(1983).
290. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 153-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
291. See id. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292. See id. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nate, in the sense of differentiation, by placing pregnancy "in a class by
itself."2 93 Justice Stevens' analysis suggests that such discrimination is
unlawful only where it imposes a detriment or burden, which in Gilbert
was the burden of a risk of absence not covered by the employer's disabil-
ity plan.29
4
Similarly, Justice Brennan's Gilbert dissent argues that under disparate
impact analysis the concept of sex discrimination incorporates the recog-
nition that policies are unlawful if they disproportionately affect employ-
ment opportunities due to sex-specific differences."' Starting from the
premise that pregnancy is a risk unique to women that may translate into
the denial of employment opportunities,296 Brennan points out that it
was precisely this result that Title VII was designed to avoid.297
[D]iscrimination is a social phenomenon encased in a social context
and, therefore, unavoidably takes its meaning from the desired end
products of the relevant legislative enactment, end products that may
demand due consideration to the uniqueness of 'disadvantaged' indi-
viduals. A realistic understanding of conditions found in today's labor
environment warrants taking pregnancy into account in failioning disa-
bility policies 2
98
Such a construction of the concept of sex discrimination, Justice Brennan
concluded, "is fully consonant with the ultimate objective of Title VII,
'to assure equality of employment opportunities.' "299
This view of pregnancy as a sex-specific condition that must be ana-
lyzed within a definition of sex discrimination that takes gender differ-
ences into account was reaffirmed in the Court's decision in Newport
293. Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
294. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. See id. at 153-55. Justice Brennan also analyzed the disability plan at issue under
disparate treatment analysis. He found that even if this analysis were defined by the
infamous Geduldig footnote, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974), the
policy in Gilbert was discriminatory because it was a pretext for sex discrimination, based
on the company's long history of discriminatory policies toward women and particularly
with respect to the treatment of pregnancy. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148-50 & n.l, 160
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
296. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 159 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is troubling that Brennan's
authority for this proposition is Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), see Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 159 & n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) a case holding that a school district violated Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by not providing adequate instruction for non-English-
speaking Chinese students. See Lau, 414 U.S. 564, 566. The Court stated that "there is
no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks,
teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively
foreclosed from any meaningful education." See id. at 566. Arguably, these students
only had a temporary disability that required affirmative policies by the school board
until they had attained an adequate command of English. However, the case may stand
for the proposition that equal or same treatment does not mean identical treatment.
299. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
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News.3" The Court considered whether a disability plan providing com-
prehensive coverage for male spouses, but excluding pregnancy from the
otherwise comprehensive coverage for female spouses, was discrimina-
tory.30' Analyzing the disability plan as the "mirror image" of Gil-
bert,3 °2 Justice Stevens again applied disparate treatment analysis,
focusing on whether the differential treatment of pregnancy constituted
unfavorable treatment.3"3 Writing for the Court, he remarked that "[tihe
1978 Act [PDA] makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-
related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions. '' 3°4 Be-
cause the policy at issue had this effect, it was unlawful under Title
VII.30 5
This concept of sex discrimination is further reinforced by Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty,3°6 a case that was decided after Gilbert but before enact-
ment of the PDA.30 7 The majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist states
that unlawful discrimination exists where the differential treatment of
pregnancy has the effect of imposing a burden on women not suffered by
men.30 ' The conferral of a pregnancy benefit does not burden women;
300. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684
(1983).
301. See id. at 671-72.
302. Id. at 685.
303. See id. at 676, 684. Although Justice Stevens' opinion analyzes the case solely
under disparate treatment analysis, see id., in Gilbert he observed that pregnancy discrim-
ination is subject to both disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis, see General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Newport News,
Justice Stevens indicated that the second clause of the PDA-"women affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employ-
ment-related purposes," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)-is not intended to foreclose analysis
under either Title VII theory. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678 n. 14.
304. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added).
305. See id. at 685.
306. 434 U.S. 136 (1977). In Satty, Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion that was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun. See id. at 137. Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall joined in Part I of that opinion and joined Justice Powell's
opinion that concurred in the result and concurred in part. See id. at 146. In addition,
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion that concurred in the judgment. See id. at 153.
307. Satty could be viewed as having little continuing validity, as the majority opinion
was tied to the now discarded analysis of Gilbert, see Satty, 434 U.S. at 141-42, and
arguably represents a tortured analysis to distinguish Gilbert. See id. at 142 ("We held in
Gilbert that § 703(a)(1) did not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex
or the other 'because of their differing roles in "the scheme of human existence,"'....
But that holding does not allow us to read § 703(a)(2) to permit an employer to burden
female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because
of their different role.") (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, to the extent Satty remains a
precedent for the treatment of pregnancy discrimination, it supports a definition of dis-
crimination that takes into account sex differences. See id. at 142.
308. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 141-42. The Court stated, "[H]ere [as compared to Gilbert],
petitioner has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do
not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer.
The distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of semantics. . . . [An
employer is not permitted] to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them
of employment opportunities because of their different role." Id. (footnote omitted).
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nor does it burden men because they simply are not similarly situated
with regard to pregnancy. Alternatively, under Justice Stevens' concur-
ring opinion in Satty, discrimination exists if a pregnancy classification
"has an adverse impact on the employee's status," 3°9 that is, "[if] the
formerly pregnant person is permanently disadvantaged as compared to
the rest of the work force."310 This analysis implicitly recognizes the
unique employment burdens that can attach to pregnancy and the neces-
sity of analyzing employment policies in terms of their impact on em-
ployment opportunities as defined by the structure of the workplace.
These cases suggest that under Title VII analysis, the Court has recog-
nized pregnancy as a gender-specific condition requiring examination of
pregnancy classifications in terms of their impact on women's employ-
ment opportunities. The Court's analysis remains unclear, however, in
two important respects. First, it is uncertain what differences beyond
pregnancy are encompassed by this analysis. Second, the Court has not
articulated how the consideration of sex differences fits within the tradi-
tional disparate treatment/disparate impact framework of Title VII anal-
ysis. Disparate treatment or disparate impact analysis, even if it takes
into account real sex differences, can only determine whether such classi-
fications invidiously discriminate against the class not benefitted by the
classification. In other words, as applied to the maternity leave statutes,
these analyses can only resolve whether such classifications are based on
a real difference between the sexes and therefore do not discriminate
against men. This approach does not define what further scrutiny is re-
quired to ensure that the classification does not discriminate against wo-
men, the class that it purports to favor. Thus, the analysis does not
address what constraints exist on efforts to permanently restructure the
workplace.
VI. REFINING THE DIFFERENCES APPROACH
The Court's opinions indicate that considering sex differences is per-
missible. However, the cases provide neither a clear definition of sex dif-
ferences nor any consistent standard for identifying when sex differences
can be the basis for sex-specific classifications in order to analyze the
validity of the maternity leave statutes.3 1 It is unclear, for example,
whether women's primary parenting role, in addition to pregnancy disa-
bility, could be viewed as a sex difference that would justify the guarantee
of maternity leave.312 It is also uncertain whether either a limitation on
309. See id. at 156 (Stevens, J., concurring).
310. Id. Stevens attempted to articulate a rationale consistent with Gilbert-despite
his dissent in that case, see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160-62 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)-that avoided the benefit/burden approach of the majority,
which he found unsatisfying because one class is always benefitted and the disfavored
class is always burdened. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 154 n.4.
311. See supra notes 247-310 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 258-61, 282-85 and accompanying text.
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the maximum leave that must be provided for pregnancy-related disabil-
ity or the guarantee of a fixed entitlement to a specified period of leave
would be objectionable on the grounds that it incorporates invalid stereo-
types about pregnancy or is based on a class-based average that is not
true in individual cases.313
What is least certain, however, is how the Court would apply its sex
differences approach to statutes aimed at restructuring the workplace.
Thus far, the Court has utilized a sex differences approach in cases chal-
lenging the exclusion of benefits on the basis of sex differences,31 4 or the
award of preferential treatment on the basis of compensating for histori-
cal discrimination.315 With its upcoming review of the California mater-
nity leave statute, the Court has the opportunity to consider whether sex
differences can be used to justify gender-specific legislation aimed at re-
structuring the workplace to ensure equal opportunity.
More broadly, the California case provides a unique opportunity for
the Court to confront the problems of its current approach to sex differ-
ences and to refine its analysis of the treatment of sex differences within
the concept of discrimination. First, the Court must define what it
means by sex differences. Some commentators have argued that this
must be narrowly defined to include only biological, definitional differ-
ences, 316 while others suggest it should include differences in moral and
social perceptions and values.31 7 The value of a narrow definition based
solely on biological, definitional differences is that it eliminates the ten-
dency to incorporate social and cultural stereotypes in the notion of
"real" differences. Recognizing a broader definition of sex differences
not only opens the door to sex stereotyping, but also assumes the exist-
ence and value of an identifiable and singular "women's culture." This is
not to demean the critique of patriarchy and the recognition of women's
different "voice." 318 Rather, to the extent an alternative system of values
and perception is sex-based, it questions to what extent it is the culture of
oppression, or one that would reinforce notions of women's inferiority.
On balance, therefore, it is best to limit the differences approach to bio-
logical, definitional differences. Pregnancy would be included within this
definition; average differences in strength or social differences in general
roles would not.319 This provides a "bright line" for defining sex differ-
313. See supra notes 275, 283.
314. See supra notes 280, 286.
315. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
316. See Fineman, supra note 81, at 818; Law II, supra note 74, at 965-69; Scales,
supra note 74, at 435-37.
317. See E. Wolgast, supra note 81, at 129; Freedman, supra note 7, at 965; Karst,
Woman's Constitution, 1984 Duke L.J. 447, 448-49.
318. For leading critiques in this area, see D. Dinnerstein, supra note 40, C. Gilligan,
supra note 40. See generally Karst, supra note 317, at 480-508 (exploring application of
women's perspective on constitutional interpretation).
319. Thus, for example, fetal vulnerability policies, which are premised on the poten-
tial reproductive harm of toxic substances in the workplace, could be applied exclusively
to women workers only if scientific data supported the proposition that the risk of harm
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ences that would prohibit recognizing differential social or cultural sex
roles as sex differences.
Second, where sex differences are the basis of a policy or statute, it is
critical that any sex-based classifications must not have the effect of rein-
forcing, perpetuating or creating sex stereotypes or gender roles. The
theoretical model so far has primarily focused on two situations in which
this must be considered.320 First, a sex-based classification may simply
be based on an invalid sex stereotype that creates a barrier to equal em-
ployment opportunity. An example of such a classification would be the
old protective labor laws for women, such as those that prohibited wo-
men from engaging in certain occupations on the basis that this was inap-
propriate work for women to do. 32' Such a classification could be
attacked both on the grounds that it does not reflect any real difference
between men and women-that is, it is not based on a biological inability
of women to perform the work--or on the basis that it imposes a limita-
tion on women's employment opportunities based on invalid cultural ste-
reotypes. Thus, the incorporation of sex stereotypes or sex roles in such
classifications is invalid either because of the definition of differences or
the objective of the classification.
Alternatively, a sex-based classification may be premised on stereo-
types or sex roles, but if the objective of the classification is to remedy the
current effects of historical discrimination that has incorporated those
stereotypes or roles, this may justify taking these historical stereotypes or
roles into account. This is a very limited exception to the general con-
demnation of sex stereotypes and gender roles under the sex differences
approach. An example of such a classification would be a sex-based af-
firmative action program. Such a classification would be permitted not
because it reflects a real sex difference, but rather because such affirma-
tive action is a legitimate means for compensating for historical discrimi-
nation.322 This valid compensatory objective could only be effectuated,
however, by means that do not incorporate or create sex stereotypes.
Thus, the means must be strictly tailored to the actual existence of histor-
ical discrimination and the necessary compensation to rectify its current
effects. The remedy must be limited by its purpose, and must not become
an unjustifiable preference.
What must be added to this analysis is how to treat sex-based classifi-
cations based on real differences that affirmatively take into account real
sex differences in order to guarantee meaningful sex equality, such as the
maternity leave statutes. Such classifications are distinguishable from
those based on alleged differences that are in fact based on sex stereo-
types or sex roles, or that create barriers to equal opportunity based upon
from exposure to such substances is unique to women or substantially greater than the
risk to men. See supra note 43.
320. See supra note 8 1.
321. See supra notes 80 and 252.
322. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
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social or cultural definitions of sex differences.323 These classifications
are based on real, physical differences between the sexes and are aimed at
ensuring, not limiting, equal employment opportunity. Similarly, they
are distinguishable from affirmative action to compensate for historical
discrimination. The goal of such classifications is not to compensate for
past wrongs but rather to recognize the existence of present discrimina-
tion that will continue to exist in the absence of structural change.
The test of sex discrimination under a differences approach of this type
of sex-based classification requires an examination of whether the policy,
statute or conduct at issue advances or impedes the goal of equal employ-
ment opportunity and whether the means chosen to achieve this goal
incorporate or reinforce culturally-based sex stereotypes. The test must
therefore focus on the structure of employment opportunity, while also
ensuring that taking sex differences into account does not create or per-
petuate invalid sex stereotypes with respect to either sex.
Analyzed under this refinement of the sex differences approach, the
maternity leave statutes are a valid means of ensuring the goal of equal
employment opportunity. The provision of job protected maternity leave
for the period of pregnancy-related disability ensures that this foresee-
able, predictable interruption of work that will occur among the vast ma-
jority of working women is not a proxy for demotion, discipline or
discharge. Where the statutes are limited to providing leave for actual
disability, they neither incorporate nor perpetuate cultural stereotypes,
but rather are tied to the physiological difference that mandates leave.
To the extent the statutes impose arbitrary limitations on leave, they im-
pose an unjustified limitation that presumes a class characteristic that
may be stereotypically or generally defined. Similarly, to the extent that
the statutes permit a fixed period of leave that may incorporate childcare
leave as well as disability leave, they are based on unjustified cultural
assumptions about the preeminent role of women with respect to
parenting.
Thus, under this analysis the maternity leave statutes are a valid means
of ensuring equal treatment of women in the employment market by
measuring the impact of that structure on employment opportunity. Just
as importantly, the requirement that the statutes not incorporate cultural
or social stereotypes imposes a critical restraint on this attempt at struc-
tural change. If sex differences are to be taken into account, then it can
be only to the extent that the differences are real.
CONCLUSION
The incorporation of a sex differences approach in the definition of sex
discrimination and the concept of equality ultimately is justified on the
basis of public policy, as an essential means to achieve the goal of equal
opportunity. Legislation such as the state maternity leave provisions is
323. See text accompanying supra notes 267, 276-81.
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necessary to ensure that the structure of the workplace affords meaning-
ful equality of opportunity. While it is certainly not the only means to
achieve that goal, it is a permissible means to take sex differences into
account.
If taking account of sex differences is not only a necessary but a desira-
ble approach on policy grounds, it nevertheless is critical that the param-
eters of this approach be carefully defined. While restructuring of the
workplace is vital to actual equality, the principles on which such struc-
tural change occurs are critical. The refinement of the analysis of sex
differences is an important step in that process.
It is only one step, however. It can ensure that efforts at equalization
of employment opportunity within the current structure of the workplace
are subject to rigorous scrutiny. Whether it can be the basis for challeng-
ing the underlying assumptions of the existing workplace structure raises
fundamental questions about the limits of legal change under current dis-
crimination law.324 If the answer to those questions is that what is re-
quired is further legal or social change, it is a step that must be taken.
324. It seems that at least some of those questions are whether this is a problem not
susceptible to legal solution, see Z. Eisenstein, supra note 38, at 19 ("Changes in the law
will not substantially alter or weaken the relations of power men derive from sexual hier-
archy."), and whether the existing framework of discrimination law could encompass
such issues or would be hostile to their resolution, see Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law.
A Critical Review, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 96-114 (D. Kairys ed.
1982) (judicial construction of the concept of race discrimination has not only blunted the
potential for radical change under discrimination law, but also acts as a limit on the anti-
discrimination principle); Ackerman, Foreward: Law in an Activist State, 92 Yale LJ.
1083, 1089 (1983) (role of the activist lawyer is to "develop a structural statement of the
facts that reveals the way an activity might be feasibly reorganized to avoid or ameliorate
the inefficiencies and injustices it may be generating") (emphasis in original).
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